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Abstract
I evaluate three replies to skepticism, drawing conclusions about the meaning of
"justified", the viability of foundationalism, the value of knowledge, and the role of
belief in rational action.
In the first chapter, I examine the following skeptical argument: Something is
justified only if justified by a justified thing; circular and infinite chains of justi-
fication are illegitimate; therefore, no belief is justified. A linguistic investigation
reveals that this argument contains two ambiguities not yet noticed by epistemolo-
gists. The linguistic observations favor foundationalism about justification, showing
how the foundationalist can maintain his view, while explaining away the force of the
skeptical argument. However, in the second chapter, I argue that foundationalism
is unsatisfactory, for non-skeptical reasons. If a foundationalist tries to explain how
some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity. But a
foundationalist should not endorse this circularity.
Dissecting a single skeptical argument is an interesting although limited endeav-
our. In the third chapter, I argue that an entire class of skeptical arguments can
be avoided. Distinguishing rational action from rational belief change, I claim that
certain changes in belief cannot occur during a rational act. In particular, I argue,
some skeptical conclusions cannot be accepted while performing an ordinary rational
act. The main conclusion of this chapter is: to avoid acting irrationally, it is rational
to avoid certain skeptical arguments.
Sometimes it is better to concede to skepticism than to flee. In the fourth chapter,
I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising
claim supports the conclusion that skepticism about knowledge is harmless. Even
if we cannot know anything about the external world-or even if we cannot know
anything at all-we may have something just as valuable as knowledge: stable true
beliefs.
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Title: Professor
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Part I
Skepticism and foundationalism

Chapter 1
What justifies that?
Abstract
I clarify and defuse an argument for skepticism about justification with the aid of some
results from recent linguistic theory. These considerations shed light on discussion
about the structure of justification.
1.1 Introduction
If the house is surrounded, then the house is surrounded by something. If your glass
is filled, then your glass is filled by something. If an eye is opened, then an eye is
opened by someone. If my belief is justified, is my belief justified by something? It
is difficult to resist saying yes; in general, it is difficult to resist the following claim:
For any B, if B is justified, then B is justified by something.
Yet, resistance matters. The claim plays a role in a central argument for skepti-
cism about justification. The claim also figures importantly in arguments against
foundationalist accounts of justification.
In this chapter, I examine whether the claim can be successfully resisted. As a
test case, I consider a skeptical argument that relies on the claim. With the help of
a little linguistics, I clarify the skeptical argument, arguing that we can both reveal
flaws in the argument, and explain its apparent compellingness. I then draw some
conclusions about discussion of the structure of justification.
Let us now see the claim at work in a skeptical argument.
1.2 The Agrippan argument
One venerable argument for skepticism about justification goes like this. Suppose that
one of my beiiefs is justified. Since my belief is justified, it is justified by something.
Now, if what justifies my belief is not itself justified, then my belief is not justified.
So, what justifies my belief is justified. But if what justifies my belief is justified,
then it is justified by something. And so on. This process either moves in a circle,
or goes on mfinitely. Since neither a circle nor an infinite chain suffices to justify my
belief, my belief is not justified. Thus we have a reductio of the claim that my belief
is justified. This argument can, at any time, be given by anyone, about any belief.
So, no belief can ever be justified.'
I suspect that few philosophers are driven to skepticism about justification by the
Agrippan argument on its own, for there are many ways to try to avoid the conclu-
sion. According to coherentism, a circular chain of justification can be legitimate.
A foundationalist thinks that each chain eventually ends. Infinitism says that an
infinite chain of justification can be acceptable. These views about the structure of
justification appear in various forms and combinations.
Although few philosophers are swayed by the Agrippan argument, many philoso-
phers rely on parts of the Agrippan argument. The best argument for coherentism
relies on the Agrippan argument (minus the premise that circular chains of justi-
fication are always illegitimate). The best argument for foundationalism relies on
the Agrippan premise that neither circular nor infinite chains suffice for justification.
Thus, plenty of non-skeptics should be interested in the Agrippan argument. An
examination of the Agrippan argument might shed light on discussions about the
structure of justification.
1Of ancient lineage, such skeptical reasoning appears in Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism
and Against the Mathematicians. Diogenes Laertius (IX 88) attributes it to one Agrippa, a philoso-
pher otherwise unmentioned in ancient manuscripts. J. Barnes discusses the Agrippan reasoning
helpfully in The Toils of Scepticism.
This rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3, I make the premises
of the Agrippan argument explicit. Then, in sections 4 and 5, I try to show that
attention to linguistic issues shows that the argument is unsound, and explains why
it appears sound. Finally, in section 6, I draw some conclusions.
1.3 The Agrippan premises
The Agrippan argument, as just presented, is a reductio of the hypothesis that some
belief is justified, relying on the following three premises: 2
Premise I: For any A, if A is justified, then A is justified by something.
Premise II: For any A and B, if A is justified, and A is justified by B, then B is
justified.
Premise III: Neither circular nor infinite chains suffice to confer justification.
So let me now turn to Premise I and Premise II.
1.3.1 Premise I and Premise II
Premise I is very compelling:
Premise I: For any A, if A is justified, then A is justified by something.
To any claim that A is justified, it seems one can coherently ask "What justifies A?"
And not only can "what justifies A?" be coherently asked, the following response is
inadequate: "Nothing justifies A, it just is justified." That the question "what justifies
A?" can be asked, demanding a substantial response, is evidence that, for any A, "A
is justified" entails "Someone or something justifies A" which, in turn, leads to "A is
justified by someone or something."
Moreover, two analogies motivate Premise I. 1. Suppose Alfred was infected with a
nasty cold. Clearly, Alfred was infected by someone (Ethelred perhaps) or something
(like a dirty glass). If becoming justified is relevantly like getting infected, then: if
2In presenting the premises, I make no mention of belief. In Premises I and II, the quantifiers
could range over beliefs, collections of beliefs, or something else. For present purposes, assume that
the quantifiers range over anything epistemically relevant. (Although I am discussing the argument
as if the conclusion is that no belief can be justified, it should be noted that similar reasoning may
be used to argue that no action, nor person, nor anything else can be justified.)
belief A is justified, then A is justified by something. 2. To be justified is to be
supported. But if something is supported, it has a support. If a book is supported,
it is supported by something. If the analogy holds, then: if a belief is justified it is
justified by something.
According to Premise II,
Premise II: For any A and B, if A is justified, and A is justified by B, then B is
justified.
This makes sense. Certainly not just anything will serve as a justifier. In particu-
lar, it's difficult to see how a B lacking justification could be a justifier. Consider an
example. Suppose your friend tells you that he believes that the Queen of England
is in San Francisco. "That's interesting," you say. "Why do you believe that?" "Be-
cause all the heads of state in the world have moved to San Francisco." "Really?"
you reply. "Why do you believe that?" "Oh, no reason at all. I just believe it," he
answers. Assuming that your friend is speaking sincerely, your friend's belief that the
Queen of England is in San Francisco seems to lack justification. And that belief,
apparently, does not justify his belief that the Queen of England is in San Francisco.
To reject Premise II is to embrace the possibility that a chain of justification can
legitimately end with something which lacks justification.
Notice that Premise II can also be motivated by the support analogy. If a book is
supported, and it is supported by a shelf, then the shelf is supported too. If the shelf
were not supported- for example, by the wall- then the book would not be supported.
So, it appears that Premise I and Premise II are both plausible. Now a few brief
remarks about Premise III.
1.3.2 Premise III
Premise III: Neither circular nor infinite chains suffice to confer justification.
Two analogies will reveal the plausibility of Premise III. Fully defending Premise
III would require arguing against various forms of coherentism. Although important,
this is not my present task.
First Analogy
Think of a belief's being justified by something as like a book's being physically
supported by something. For example, my copy of The Great Chain of Being is
supported by a shelf. Moreover, my book is part of a structure of support: my book
is supported by the shelf; the shelf is supported by the wall; the wall is supported by
the foundation of the building; and so on.
Now, plausibly, if a book is supported, then it is part of an acceptable sup-
port structure. And, clearly, some structures of support are not acceptable. Self-
supporting structures, for example, are not acceptable: the book cannot be physi-
cally supported by itself. In addition- if the support relation is transitive- no circular
structures are acceptable. You see the point: if, as seems plausible, "A is justified by
B" describes a relation between A and B that is anti-symmetric and transitive, then
A's being part of a circular chain does not suffice to make A justified.3
We can rule out infinite structures of physical support with empirical premises.
Infinite structures of physical support require an infinite amount of matter. If there is
a finite amount of matter in the universe, then infinite structures of physical support
are impossible. Similarly we may look for empirical premises to rule out infinite chains
of justification. Since humans are finite, they cannot understand infinite chains of
justification. So infinite chains do not suffice to make human beliefs justified.4
An analogy is not an argument. Still, if being justified by something is relevantly
like being physically supported by something, then we have reason to accept Premise
III.
Second Analogy
Think of a belief's being justified as like a person's catching a cold. A healthy
person can be infected by coming into contact with a person who is already infected.
Consider, for simplicity, a cold caused by a virus that cannot survive outside a human
3J. Barnes makes this and other helpful points in The Toils of Skepticism..
4A thought like this goes back to at least Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.3. Much more ought to
be said to turn this thought into an argument. Recently, Peter Klein has defended the viability of
infinite chains. See [38].
body. And suppose that a person can be infected with this virus only once in his
lifetime.
Now if Arnold was infected by Ziggy, and Ziggy was infected by Leonard, then it
does not follow that Arnold was infected by Leonard. At least, it is not obvious that
the relation of being infected by is transitive. Still epidemiological circles are ruled
out because we are assuming that you can only be infected by this virus once in your
lifetime. So it cannot be that you infected yourself; and it cannot be that Arnold
was infected by Ziggy, and Ziggy was infected by Arnold. Moreover, since there have
only been finitely many people existing in the world, a chain of infection cannot trace
back through an infinite number of different people.
According to this analogy, A gets justified by being "infected" by some B that
is already "infected". If A is justified by B, then A is justified only if B is already
justified. A can't "infect" itself with justification, nor can A get "infected" by being
part of a circular chain. If there are only finitely many justifiable things then we can
rule out infinite chains too.
If being justified is relevantly like catching a cold, then it seems that we have some
reason to accept Premise III.
So, it appears that Premise III, as well as Premise I and Premise II, are plausible.
And it also appears that accepting each of Premise I, II and III leads to skepticism
about justification. However, despite appearances, skepticism about justification does
not follow from Premise I, II and III. To see this we will need some conceptual
sharpening. A little linguistics will help to get clearer about what is the case when
something is justified.
1.4 Some ambiguity
Sentences of the form "X is justified" are syntactically ambiguous. They have at least
three distinct readings. Call this the ambiguity thesis.
If the ambiguity thesis is correct, then Premise I and Premise II are syntactically
ambiguous too. If so, then the soundness of the Agrippan argument is suspect. For
the argument is sound only if those disambiguations of Premise I and II that are true,
are sufficient (with Premise III) for the conclusion.
I will defend the claim that the Agrippan argument has an unfilled gap: the
plausibly true readings of Premise I and II are not sufficient (with Premise III) for
the conclusion.
I will also defend the claim that the ambiguity thesis helps explain the plausi-
bility of the Agrippan argument: Premise I and II are plausibly true on different
disambiguations of "A is justified", and we fail to notice the shift between readings.
I will now present evidence to support the ambiguity thesis. After that, I will
argue for the two further claims.
1.4.1 An old worry?
Some philosophers have worried that the meaning of "justify", and "justified" varies
with context, and that this causes confusion in epistemological discussion. These
are concerns that, I think, are on the right track. However, in the literature, these
concerns are presented unclearly and confusedly. Here are two examples.
1. Some philosophers observe that a sentence like "My belief is justified" can
apparently be understood merely to say that my belief has a certain status, that of
being justified. But on a different understanding, the sentence seems to describe the
activity of a person showing that a belief has that status.5
2. Some philosophers have noticed that justification sometimes seems to come in
degrees, and sometimes not. On the one hand, one belief may be more justified than
another. On the other hand, it seems that having a status does not come in degrees;
a belief either has the status of being justified or not.6
5W. Alston remarks on the "pervasive confusion between the activity of justifying a belief- showing
the belief to be reasonable, credible, or justified- and a belief's being justified, where this is some
kind of epistemic state or condition of the believer." ("What's Wrong with Immediate Knowledge?"
p 70). See also ("Level Confusions in Epistemology" p 166). R,. Audi makes a similar point in The
Structure of Justification (pp 25-26, also chapters 4 and 10), as does J. Pryor ("The Skeptic and the
Dogmatist", p 535), who claims that the status of being justified is "epistemologically primary". R.
Chisholm conspicuously avoids forms of the word "justify" in his epistemic principles and definitions
in Theory of Knowledge (pp 135-140).
6 A. Goldman, for example, notices this in "What is Justified Belief?" and in chapter 4 of
Epistemology and Cognition.
In other work, I plan to address the second worry, and its relevance to skepticism
about justification. My claims here are connected to the first worry.
1.4.2 Eventive and stative readings of passive sentences
7An analysis of sentences like "My belief is justified" is rather complicated, so let me
begin with some simpler examples:
1 That door was closed
2 My house was surrounded
Passive sentences like 1 and 2 have two easily distinguishable readings. On one
reading, 1 describes an event or a process, namely someone (or something) closing a
door.8 On another reading, 1 describes a state, namely the state of the door after
having been closed. Similarly, 2 can describe the event of someone (or something)
surrounding my house; or it can describe the state of my house after having been
surrounded. Many- perhaps most- English verbs form passive sentences with these
two readings.
This difference, between a stative reading of 1 and an eventive reading of 1 can be
even more clearly seen if we add a time modifier:
3 That door was closed yesterday at 3pm
Was the door in a closed state just before 3pm yesterday? On an eventive reading,
the door was in an unclosed state just before 3pm, and then someone or something
closed it at 3pm. On a stative reading, the door may or may not have been in a
closed state just before 3pm. So, the two readings of "That door was closed yesterday
7The discussion in this section and the next is indebted to Embick (2000), Marantz (2000) and
Marvin (2000). Many of the example sentences are from Embick (2000). Thanks to Tatjana Marvin
and Karlos Arregi.
sFrom now on I will just say "event" because I am not here examining the differences (if any)
among events, processes and other non-states. Also, for convenience, I will sometimes speak loosely,
saying that a sentence S entails the existence of some event. What I mean is that S entails S', where
S' is a sentence that is often taken by philosophers to describe an event. Whether or not you take
S' to commit one to the existence of an event depends on your own ontological scruples.
at 3pm" have different entailments. Using a superscript E to indicate an eventive
reading, and a superscript S for a stative reading, we can say that "That door was
closed yesterday at 3pm"E entails
4 That door was not in a closed state yesterday just before 3pm
while "That door was closed yesterday at 3pm."s lacks this entailment.
Similarly,
5 My house was surrounded by Federal agents yesterday at Spm
can describe the state of my house yesterday at 3pm, or, instead, an untoward event
at that time.
1.4.3 Another stative reading
Consider the following sentences:
6 That door was built closed
7 My house was built surrounded
8 * That door was built opened
9 * That door was built smashed
10 * That kettle was forged cleaned
8, 9 and 10 are very odd.9 However, 6 and 7 make perfect sense. The problem
with 8 seems to be that "opened" indicates not only that the door was in an open
state, but also that there was an earlier door opening. But, if the door was built
that way, there was no earlier door opening. Similarly, the problem with 9 seems to
be that "smashed" indicates not only that the door was in a smashed state, but also
9The '*' indicates that most native English speaking informants judge that sentence to be un-
grammatical. Some informants do find some of the starred examples acceptable, but I have found
no one who finds all such examples acceptable. (J. Pryor and J. Wilson helped think of examples.)
that there was an earlier door smashing. But, if the door was built that way, there
was no earlier door smashing.
The data suggest the following. "That door was opened" (on a stative reading) en-
tails the existence of an earlier event of opening that door. "That door was smashed"
(on a stative reading) entails the existence of an earlier event of smashing that door.
"That kettle was cleaned" (on a stative reading) entails the existence of an earlier
event of cleaning that kettle.
On the other hand, "That door was closed" (on a stative reading) need not entail
that there was an earlier event of closing that door. And "My house was surrounded"
(on a stative reading) need not entail that there was an earlier surrounding event.
In short, it appears that there are two stative readings available for passive sen-
tences: an eventive stative reading, which entails the existence of a certain earlier
event and a pure stative reading, which lacks this entailment. I'll indicate the even-
tive stative reading with a superscript ES, reserving the superscript S for the pure
stative reading. Thus, if "X was V'ed" has both an eventive stative and a pure stative
reading, then "X was V'ed" ES entails "Someone (or something) V'ed X",1o while "X
was V'ed"s lacks this entailment.
Given that two stative readings are available for passive sentences, one might ask
whether any single passive sentence exhibits both stative readings. I believe that the
answer is yes, although I am unable to show this by simple and intuitive means. Still
there is the thought from the last section: "On another reading, 1 describes a state,
namely the state of a door after having been closed." Did you find that peculiar
when I said it? If not, you have a reason to think that "That door was closed"ES is
available.
Despite the lack of a compellingly clear example, I will maintain that some passive
sentences (like "That door was closed") have at least three readings: the eventive,
the eventive stative and the pure stative. I adopt this hypothesis to help simplify
the exposition of my argument; the argument survives (in a modified form) without
loWhere this is a (disambiguated) sentence describing an event. Note that in this generalization
'ed' represents the appropriate passive or past tense ending. For example, the passive "The window
was broken" entails the past tense "Someone (or something) broke the window".
it. Sufficient for a version of my argument is a weaker claim: some passive sentences
have both an eventive and an eventive stative reading; some passive sentences have
both an eventive and a pure stative reading. I believe that the weaker claim is well
supported by the intuitive examples I have given.
1.4.4 Summary
This table summarizes the three readings of some passive sentences:
1.4.5 A syntactic ambiguity
I have just suggested that some passive sentences have at least three readings. The
argument was rough, based on intuitive judgments about meaning and entailment.
That there are three readings of sentences like "That door was closed" is compat-
ible with recent linguistic theory. Some generative linguists theorize that sentences
like "That door was closed" and "My house was surrounded" are syntactically am-
biguous. According to them, such English sentences correspond to at least three
distinct syntactic structures."1
One might try to explain the differences without positing a syntactic ambiguity.
What is important here is that, however the differences between SE, SES, and Ss are
explained, they may have different entailments. I assume that this claim has been
made reasonable. My main claims in this chapter neither depend on the claim that
the ambiguity is syntactic, nor depend on a particular syntactic theory. My claim
so far is that some passive sentences have three readings, and these readings have
different entailments. 12
"See, for example, Embick (2000).
12Note that Kratzer (2000) develops a slightly different distinction (due to Parsons (1990)) between
target state passives and resultant state passives: "If I throw a ball onto the roof, the target state of
this event is the ball's being on the roof, a state that may or may not last for a long time. What
I am calling the Resultant-state is different; it is the state of my having thrown the ball onto the
Eventive SE describes the occurrence of an event
Eventive Stative SES a state resulting from an earlier event
Pure Stative S s a "pure" state: no earlier event implied
However, that there is a reasonably well developed syntactic theory, attempting to
explain the three readings as a case of syntactic ambiguity, supports what I will say
in at least two ways. First, the notion of syntactic ambiguity seems to me to be one
that is both less controversial and easier to understand than, for example, various
mysterious claims that philosophers are prone to make about context dependence.
Second, the syntactic theory is intended to explain other kinds of data. It has a
degree of empirical support, both by English and by other languages. So if a syntactic
ambiguity is posited by such a theory, we have reason, beyond the rough intuitive
evidence above, to believe that it is present. In particular, we have a reason to believe
that a syntactic ambiguity is present that is independent of philosophical exigencies.
1.4.6 "justified", finally
Like "That door was closed" and "My house was surrounded",
11 My belief was justified
has at least three readings. As before, it is easy to distinguish an ,eventive reading
from a stative reading by adding an indication of time:
12 My belief was justified yesterday at 3pm
For an eventive reading, one can imagine that the evidence arrived yesterday at
3pm, thereby justifying my belief. On a stative reading, the sentence describes the
state of my belief yesterday at 3pm.' 3
As before, we can test for a pure stative reading. The sentence
13 My belief was formed justified
roof, and it is a state that cannot cease holding at some later time." (Parsons (1990), p 234 quoted
by Kratzer (2000), p 2.) I don't believe that this way of drawing the distinction is correct because
it mistakenly predicts that "That door is opened" can be true if someone opened the door, closed
it again, and now the door remains firmly shut. In any event, Kratzer agrees that some passive
sentences are ambiguous between a reading which is event entailing and a reading which is not.
"
1 Both "Rico's belief was justified by him" and "Rico's belief was justified by the evidence" have
eventive readings. So the eventive/stative distinction I am drawing is not the one mentioned earlier
between a person's performing an activity, and a belief's having a certain status. (See footnote 5.)
is as innocuous as "That door was built closed", and "That house was built sur-
rounded". Moreover, "My belief was always justified" is acceptable too. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude, as before, that there is a stative reading of "My belief was
justified" that entails that there was a justifying event, and a stative reading that
lacks this entailment. 14
1.4.7 A further complication
Before I can connect these observations to the Agrippan argument, I need to clarify
the entailments of different passive sentences.
So far, I have concluded that, where S is a passive sentence with all three readings,
both SE and SES entail the existence of a certain event, while Ss does not. "X
was V'ed"E and "X was V'ed" ES both entail "Someone (or something) V'ed X". "X
was V'ed"s does not. For example, "That door was closed" E entails "Someone (or
something) closed the door", as does "That door was closed." ES "That door was
closed"s does not entail "Someone (or something) closed the door". "That door was
closed"s describes the door as being in a certain state. "That door was closed"ES
describes the door as being in a certain state as the result of a closing event.
However these conclusions need to be qualified. Sometimes "X was V'ed"s does
entail "Someone (or something) V'ed X". To see this, note that "surround" differs
from "closed". If the dool was built closed, then it is not the case that someone
closed the door. Even if my house was built surrounded, then something surrounded
14The data is confusing. Some native English speakers find "My belief was formed justified" odd.
Thus, according to them, "My belief was justified" resembles "The door was opened", in having only
the eventive and the eventive stative readings. (Alec Marantz (p.c.) also suggests that there are
some theoretical reasons to expect that "justified" is like "opened", and thus that "My belief was
justified" lacks the pure stative reading.) Other native speakers find that they cannot hear anything
like an eventive stative reading of "My belief was justified". According to them, "My belief was
justified" only has the pure stative and eventive readings.
If there are indeed two rather than three readings of "My belief is justified", the claim I will make
about arguments that use sentences like "My belief is justified" survives in a modified form. Even if
no passive sentence exhibits both stative readings, as long as some passive sentences have an eventive
stative reading, and some passive sentences have a pure stative reading, one may claim that people
can be unsure or confused or even disagree about whether a non-eventive reading of "My belief is
justified" is an eventive stative or a pure stative. This is enough for the kind of argument I am
making.
my house. "My house was surrounded"S entails "Something surrounded my house".
Noting a further ambiguity shows how to repair the conclusions. The active sen-
tence "Something surrounded my house" has both an eventive and a stative reading.
One can see the contrast by comparing "Someone closed the door at 3pm yesterday"
with "Something surrounded my house at 3pm yesterday". The former has one, even-
tive, reading. The latter has both stative and eventive readings. That suggests the
following generalizations. "X was V'ed"s does not entail an eventive "Someone (or
something) V'ed X". However, for some, but not all, choices of V, "X was V'ed"s
does entail a stative "Someone (or thing) V'ed X".
What about "My belief was justified"s ? This is not an easy question. It is
not obvious whether being justified is like being closed or like being surrounded.
The active sentence "Something justified my belief" has both eventive and stative
readings. But if my belief was always justified, did something justify my belief? That
is not clear to me. If "My belief was justified"s is true, did something justify my
belief? I am not sure, but I hope to find out.
The cogency of the Agrippan argument hinges on the answer. 15
1.4.8 A is justified by B
Before returning to the Agrippan argument, I must discuss different readings of pas-
sive sentences including a by-phrase: "That door was opened by John", or "My belief
150ne further complication deserves mention. While I have discussed past tense passive sentences,
the Agrippan argument is given in the present tense. Pure stative, eventive stative, and non-stative
readings are also available in the present tense.
Non-stative readings are easily recognized. "That door is closed" has the habitual reading that
someone usually closes the door. There is also the so-called "sportscaster" reading. Imagine an
announcer narrating the action in a play. "She walks toward the open door. Suddenly, the door is
closed. 'Must've been the wind' she says." "My belief is justified" has these non-stative readings
too.
Now that I have identified them, in what follows, I will ignore non-stative readings of "A is
justified". I do so because non-stative readings are easy to distinguish from stative readings. For
example, neither the habitual reading nor the sportscaster reading is likely to cause confusion in
our understanding of the Agrippan argument. Perhaps confusion between stative and non-stative
readings plays a role in other epistemological discussions. I just doubt that that is the case here.
More importantly, the pure stative/eventive stative distinction is also seen in the present tense.
Note the contrast between "The door is closed" and "The door is opened." While "The door
is closed" may be true because the door was built closed, "The door is opened" is, on a stative
reading, only true if there was an earlier door opening event.
is justified by the evidence".
In "The rabid dog was killed by the laws of Texas", the word "by" means "ac-
cording to" or "in virtue of". But in "The ball was kicked by John", "by" does not
mean "in virtue of". Moreover, in "The rabid dog was killed by the police by the
laws of Texas", only the second "by" has the "in virtue of" / "according to" meaning.
Now suppose that A is justified by B by induction. If so, then A is justified by B, and
A is justified by induction. But this does not mean that induction bears the same
relation to A as B bears to A.
For simplicity, I will initially assume that the "by" in "A is justified by B" does
not mean "in virtue of" or "according to". I will later dispense with this assumption.
As far as whether passive sentences with a by-phrase show an eventive/stative am-
biguity, some facts are clear. In some cases, the by-phrase forces an eventive reading.
"That door was smashed" has both eventive and stative readings; however, "That
door was smashed by John" only describes an event in which John smashed the door.
Many- perhaps most- verbs follow this pattern. Other verbs form unambiguously
stative active sentences ("John owned the house") and unambiguously stative passive
sentences ("The house was owned by John"). There is also a third class of verbs. As
just observed, verbs like "surround", and "justify" form active sentences that have
both stative and eventive readings. In the passive, with a by-phrase, such verbs yield
both stative and eventive readings. "My house was surrounded by Federal agents at
3pm yesterday" can either describe the state of my house at 3pm or an untoward
event at 3pm.
I am not sure whether sentences like "My house is surrounded by Federal agents"
which have at least one stative reading, have more than one stative reading. For one
thing, it is not clear what an eventive stative reading would be. Perhaps we may find
different stative readings by searching for different entailments. It may be that, on
one reading, "A is justified by B" entails "A is justified"s, while, on another reading,
this entailment is lacking. Or, perhaps, "A is justified by B" can either mean that A
is fully justified by B, or that A is partly justified by B. That is, "A is (fully) justified
by B" and "B is justified"s together entail "A is justified" s , while "A is (partly)
justified by B" and "B is justified"s do not.
The situation is confusing. In order to chart a clear path, I will ignore this possible
plethora of readings, and assume for purposes here that "A is justified by B" has only
one reading, a stative reading that lacks these entailments. I make this simplifying
assumption because at this point I unfortunately do not know how to clear things up.
1.5 Back to the Agrippan argument
We are now in a position to examine the Agrippan argument. One goal of this
section is to defend the thesis that the Agrippan argument has an unfilled gap: the
plausibly true readings of Premise I and II are not sufficient (with Premise III) for
the conclusion. A second goal is to explain how that thesis helps a non-skeptic.
1.5.1 Eventive Stative Version
Let me now clarify the Agrippan argument by disentangling eventive statives from
pure statives. Recall the premises:
Premise I: For any A, if A is justified, then A is justified by something.
Premise II: For any A and B, if A is justified, and A is justified by B, then B is
justified.
Premise III: Neither circular nor infinite chains suffice to confer justification.
Since Premise III is not my central focus here, let us accept Premise III. Premises
I and II contain as parts sentences of the form "X is justified". Since such sentences
are ambiguous, plausibly, Premises I and II are ambiguous too. So we can try to
disambiguate Premises I and II. First, take the ambiguous parts as eventive statives: 16
Premise Ia: if A is justifiedES, then A is justified by something.
Premise IIaa: if A is justifiedES, and A is justified by B, then B is justifiedES
These premises (coupled with Premise III) are sufficient for the skeptical conclu-
sion. Should we accept them?
161 suppress the initial quantifiers, and also abuse notation slightly by attaching the superscript
to "justified", but the meaning should be clear.
There is reason to accept Premise Ia. As claimed earlier, "A was justified' "ES
entails "Something justified A". This is the entailment that distinguishes the eventive
stative from the pure stative. So, apparently, "A is justified"ES entails "Something
justifies A". Thus, "A is justified"ES arguably entails "A is justified by something"."
However, Premise IIaa is in doubt. Recall the example given in section 1.3.1 in
support of Premise II. An unjustified belief that all the heads of state have moved to
San Francisco does not justify a belief that the Queen of England is in San Francisco.
This thought provides a reason to accept that only a B in a justified state can serve
as a justifier. This is not, however, a reason to accept that only a B in a justified
state as a result of an earlier justifying event can serve as a justifier. This thought
does not adequately support Premise IIaa.
Thus, I conclude that it is not clear whether or not to accept Premise IIaa. Further
argument is needed. Perhaps someone could provide further argument. I merely point
out that Premise IIaa lacks the evident plausibility that we found in Premise II. This
version of the Agrippan argument is incomplete, as it stands.
1.5.2 Pure Stative Version
Perhaps disambiguating in favor of the pure stative holds promise:
Premise Ib: if A is justified s , then A is justified by something.
Premise IIbb: if A is justifieds, and A is justified by B, then B is justifieds.
These two premises (coupled with Premise III) are also sufficient for the skeptical
conclusion.
We have reason to accept Premise IIbb. Unlike Premise IIaa, Premise IIbb con-
tains "B is justified"s rather than "B is justified" ES. The earlier thought that there
are no unjustified justifiers does support Premise IIbb.
Premise Ib, however, is in doubt. As I urged in section 1.4.7, although it is clear
that if that house was built surrounded, then it was surrounded by something, it is
not obvious that if a belief was formed justified that it was justified by something.
17There is a leap here. "A is justified" ES entails "Something justified A" (on an eventive reading).
So, plausibly, it entails "Something justifies A" (on a stative reading).
No matter how that house got into a state of being surrounded, it was surrounded by
something; "That house was surrounded"s entails "That house was surrounded by
something". However, "A is justified""s may be true because A was formed justified.
And if A was formed justified, it is not clear that A was (or is) justified by something.
It is not clear whether or not to accept Premise Ib.
Thus, this version of the argument is also incomplete, as it stands.
1.5.3 Mixed Version
So far, we have seen that disambiguating in favor of the pure stative makes Premise
II look good, at the expense of casting doubt on Premise I. And disambiguating in
favor of the eventive stative makes Premise I looks good, at the expense of casting
doubt on Premise II. Since each of the two premises has a plausible disambiguation,
we can try combining them together:
Premise Ia: if A is justifiedES, then A is justified by something.
Premise IIbb: if A is justifieds , and A is justified by B, then B is justified s .
Despite their plausibility, Premise Ia and Premise IIbb (coupled with Premise III)
are not sufficient for the skeptical conclusion. Drawing the skeptical conclusion would
be to equivocate between the pure stative and the eventive stative. The argument
needs something more to link these premises together. These two supplementary
premises will do the job:
Premise ES-S: if A is justifiedES, then A is justifieds,
Premise S-ES: if A is justifieds , then A is justifiedES,
Premise ES-S is clearly true. "A is justified"' ES entails "A is justified"s: it is
impossible for A to be in a state (and be in that state as a result of a justifying
event), and fail to be in that state.
Premise S-ES is a substantial claim in need of argument. It needs to be argued
that any justified A is in that state as the result of a justifying event. Or at least, for
a restricted version of the Agrippan argument, every justified belief is in that state
as the result of a justifying event.
Perhaps a philosopher could defend Premise S-ES, or find some other way to make
this version of the argument valid. But, as it stands, this version of the argument is,
like the others, incomplete.
1.5.4 Other Versions
We have examined three versions of the argument so far. There are eight versions
of the argument in all, because there are two disambiguations of Premise I, and four
disambiguations for Premise II. For the sake of completeness, here are all of them:
Premise Ia: if A is justifiedES, then A is justified by something.
Premise Ib: if A is justifieds, then A is justified by something.
Premise IIaa: if A is justifiedES, and A is justified by B, then B is justifiedES
Premise IIab: if A is justifiedES, and A is justified by B, then B is justifieds
Premise IIba: if A is justifieds , and A is justified by B, then B is justifiedES
Premise IIbb: if A is justified s , and A is justified by B, then B is justifieds .
We need not tarry long on other versions of the argument. Premise IIab is plausible
because, given Premise ES-S, IIab follows from the plausible IIbb. However, like IIbb,
IIab cannot be combined with Ia without something like the controversial Premise
S-ES. Premise IIba can be successfully combined with Ia. However, IIba is at least as
controversial as the controversial IIaa. For, like IIaa, IIba has an eventive stative in
the consequent. Finally, although three further versions of the argument include Ib
they are not worth examining; if Ib can be defended than the Pure Stative Version
can be defended.
1.5.5 The gap
The plausible premises- Ia, IIbb and IIab- cannot be combined with Premise III
to produce an argument sufficient for the Agrippan conclusion. I conclude that the
argument has an unfilled gap.
Each of the following three premises will fill the gap: Premise Ib, Premise IIaa,
Premise S-ES. The last premise yields the other two. For suppose that Premise S-ES
is true. Then Ib follows from the Ia. And (given Premise ES-S) IIaa follows from
IIbb.
1.5.6 Shifty by-phrases
I have been assuming that "A is justified by B" has a univocal, stative meaning.
But, earlier I pointed out an ambiguity in passive sentences with by-phrases. In a
sentence like "A is justified by B by induction", the second "by" means something
like "in virtue of" or "according to", while the first does not. Perhaps shiftiness in
the meaning of the by-phrase also plays a role in the Agrippan argument. Let's have
a look.
The controversial Premise Ib,
Premise Ib: If A is justifieds, then A is justified by something,
seems trivially true if "by" here means "in virtue of". Surely "A is justified" S, if true,
is true in virtue of something; something makes it the case that A is in that state. If,
instead, "by" takes on its usual meaning then Premise Ib is a controversial claim.
Moreover, any version of Premise II looks implausible on the "in virtue of" reading.
For if A is justified, and A is justified in virtue of B, why should we think that B is
justified? For example, I may be justified in believing some things in virtue of my
experience. But why think that my experience is something that needs to be- or
even can be- justified?
Shiftiness in the meaning of the by-phrase is one more source of confusion in
discussions of justification. And, perhaps, it is one more reason why the Agrippan ar-
gument appears compelling. On the "in virtue of" reading, Premise Ib looks trivially
true. On the other reading, Premise IIbb is plausible.
1.5.7 Two small steps forward for the non-skeptic
The thesis that there is an unfilled gap helps a non-skeptic in two ways.
First, the non-skeptic can explain away the force of the Agrippan argument.
Premise I appears true because Premise Ia is true. Premise II appears true be-
cause Premise IIbb is true. And the Agrippan argument appears valid because, on
some disambiguations of the premises, the argument is valid. If it is one part of the
non-skeptic's task to explain why this skeptical argument appears plausible, then the
non-skeptic has strengthened her position.
Second, the Agrippan argument poses no threat to the non-skeptic. The Agrippan
argument is incomplete without an additional premise like Ib, IIaa or S-ES, and an
incomplete argument does not threaten the non-skeptic's position.
These two points may not seem strong. One might wish, for example, for an
argument that Ib, IIaa and S-ES are false. Still, even these two limited points are
interesting, at least for the foundationalist about justification. Consider the following
dialectic between skeptic and foundationalist. The skeptic presents Premises I, II and
III to argue that no belief can be justified. The foundationalist, assuming that some
beliefs are justified, argues that Premise I is false. Is the burden of proof on the skeptic
or the foundationalist? Is one side begging the question? If the skeptic's argument has
an unfilled gap the foundationalist is free to offer her argument without responding
to the skeptic's argument. Worries about question beggingness and burden of proof
can be set aside, at least until some other skeptical argument rears its head. s1
1.6 Concluding remarks
I began this chapter with the following difficult to deny claim:
Premise I: For any B, if B is justified, then B is justified by something.
I displayed the central role Premise I plays in the Agrippan argument. Examining
English passive sentences revealed that this premise, as well as Premise II of the
Agrippan argument, are ambiguous. I concluded that the argument has an unfilled
gap, and that this helps the non-skeptic.
What further conclusions can be drawn from this exercise?
18Curiously, the foundationalist who argues in favor of Premise III may run into trouble with the
Agrippan argument. For the support analogy also favors Premise Ib. And the infection analogy
favors the entailment from "A is justified"s to "A is justified"' ES . On either analogy, the gap is
filled! Thus, if the thought behind either of the analogies is what drives the foundationalist to
accept Premise III, then the foundationalist's reasons in favor of Premise III may undermine her
attempts to reject the Agrippan argument.
1. As I noted earlier, few philosophers are driven to skepticism by the Agrippan
argument, but the argument is interesting nonetheless. The premises of the Agrippan
argument form a common core around which turns the debate about the structure
of justification. Foundationalists, coherentists, and infinitists all accept one or more
of the premises of the Agrippan argument. They just disagree about which premises
to accept. For example, coherentists and infinitists reject Premise III and accept
Premises I and II, while foundationalists accept Premise III and reject Premise I or
II.
What I have shown here helps clarify this debate. To successfully argue against
foundationalism, coherentist/infinitists should argue for Ia, IIbb or ES-S. Founda-
tionalists must resist all three of Ia, IIbb and ES-S. In resisting, foundationalists can
add that Premise I and II appear true because they are true on some readings. For
instance, is Premise I true? If a belief is justified is it justified by something? A
foundationalist might say that this seems so because Premise Ib is true.
2. The present linguistic investigation provides distinctions useful for philosophers.
Here are some examples. As noted earlier, Alston (and others) draw a distinction
between a person's performing the activity of justifying a belief and a belief's having
the status of being justified. Now we can gain more precision. First, there is the
distinction between a state and an event. A belief may be in a certain state, or an
event may occur in which a belief enters that state. That event need not involve an
activity of "justifying a belief" performed by a person. Second, there is a difference
between being in a state as a result of a certain event, and merely being in that state.
These distinctions are blurred by the English passive.
In addition, English passives with by-phrases are a source of unclarity. Some
foundationalists (e.g. Steup[60], Pryor[54], Feldman[24]) like to say that a belief
can be justified by experience but experience is not the kind of thing that needs
justification. I suspect that this is loose talk. As noted earlier, by-phrases can take on
an "in virtue of" / "according to" reading. In "That bar was closed by the police by the
laws of Massachusetts," only the second by-phrase means "in virtue of" or "according
to". Such foundationalists appear to mean that some beliefs can be justified in virtue
of experience. But, the usual regress argument for foundationalism begins with a
premise like "some beliefs are justified by other beliefs." Here the "in virtue of'
reading is not what is called for. Apparently, some foundationalists confusingly mix
together different readings of the by-phrase. (I say more about this in Chapter 2.)
3. Finally, the investigation begun here about passive sentences may bear fruit
beyond epistemology. If all event was caused, was it caused by something? If a prop-
erty was exemplified, was it exemplified by something? Getting clear about passive
sentences like "X was caused" and "Y was exemplified" may help us clarify these
questions, and the discussions where they are asked. It may sound unfashionable,
but I am encouraged, by the results here, to believe that patient and careful study of
language will help move philosophical discussion forward.
1.7 Onward
A foundationalist need not succumb to the Agrippan argument. Does that mean that
foundationalism is the best theory of the structure of justification? In Chapter 2, I
argue that the answer is no. There are non-skeptical reasons to think foundationalism
unsatisfactory.
Dissecting the Agrippan argument may be interesting, but avoiding the conclusion
of one skeptical argument is a limited endeavour. There are many skeptical arguments,
and many skeptical conclusions. In Chapters 3 and 4, I ambitiously argue that we
can respond to a large class of skeptical arguments at once.

Chapter 2
Obscure Foundationalism
Abstract
Foundationalism about justification is unsatisfactory. If a foundationalist tries to ex-
plain how some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity.
However, a foundationalist should not endorse this circularity.
2.1 A puzzle for the foundationalist?
The foundationalist, noting that some justified beliefs are justified by other justified
beliefs, argues that not all justified things are justified by other justified things. For
if all justified things are justified by other justified things, then either circular or
infinite chains of justification are legitimate. But neither circular nor infinite chains
of justification are legitimate. Furthermore, nothing is justified by an unjustified
thing. So, the foundationalist concludes, since some beliefs are justified, some things
are basic. They are justified, but not justified by other things.
Such is a version of the so-called regress argument, the main argument for foun-
dationalism about justification. It is not my present goal to examine the merits of
the regress argument in detail. Instead, I intend to study the viability of the foun-
dationalist picture which emerges from the regress argument: some things are basic;
all justified beliefs are either basic, or ultimately derive their justificatory status from
basic things; circular and infinite chains of justification are not legitimate. In Chap-
ter 1, I suggested that the foundationalist can evade the Agrippan argument, while
explaining away its appeal. If this is correct, then the foundationalist can successfully
resist the Agrippan argument. Now, setting skepticism aside, I will raise a different
kind of problem for foundationalism.
I will argue that the best foundationalist solution is to decline to offer an ex-
planation why or how basic things are justified. Call this obscure foundationalism.
More popular views are rather less obscure. Most foundationalists attempt to ex-
plain why or how basic things are justified. For example, some philosophers think
that perceptual beliefs can be basic, and they try to explain this by alluding to a
special relationship that perceptual beliefs have to our experiences that can make
perceptual beliefs justified. I believe that such explanatory attempts face a serious
difficulty. I will argue that only obscure foundationalism avoids the.difficulty. If we
are to be foundationalists, we should be obscure foundationalists. I will conclude
that, to the extent that obscure foundationalism is unsatisfactory, foundationalism is
unsatisfactory.
Next I will present the foundationalist framework with some care. After that I
will present a difficulty for those foundationalists who attempt to explain why or how
basic things are justified.
2.2 Vanilla foundationalism
2.2.1 Some symbolism
I will next state with more precision the theses that foundationalists share. For
brevity, I will help myself to some symbolism. "Ja" abbreviates "a is justified".
"a < b" abbreviates "a is justified by b". The symbol "<" can be repeated. For
example, "a < b < c" is "a is justified by b, and b is justified by c."
Recall that in Chapter 1, I argued that sentences like "a is justified" and "a is
justified by b" are ambiguous. So something must be said to isolate the intended
readings of "Ja" and "a < b".
Among the readings of "a is justified" are two ways of describing a's state. An
eventive stative reading describes a as being in a certain state as the result of a
justifying event. A pure stative reading merely describes a as being in a certain
state. Sentences like "Ja" are to be taken, unambiguously, in the pure stative sense.
(Readers may consult Chapter 1 for a more detailed explanation of the intended
reading.)
"a is justified by b" also has more than one reading. In order to focus on the
intended reading for "a < b", it will help to first set aside some extraneous readings.
As noted in Chapter 1, on one reading of "a is justified by b," "by b" means
"in virtue of b" or "according to b". On other readings, "by b" means something
else. For example, in "This belief was justified by that belief by induction," only
the second "by" means "in virtue of" or "according to". I will set aside the in-
virtue-of/according-to reading; "a < b" is NOT to be understood in the in-virtue-
of/according-to sense.
Another reading to set aside is one in which "a is justified by b" describes an event.
This is not the intended reading of "a < b"; "a < b" should be taken to describe a
state. (It is easy to see the difference in the past tense: "a was justified by b at noon
yesterday" can either describe a's state yesterday at noon, or it can describe an event,
which occurred at noon, in which a entered a justified state.)
Now that we have set these extraneous readings aside, let me delineate the in-
tended reading of "a < b". It is possible to read "a is justified by b" so that "Ja"
follows. I intend this to be true of "a < b". Thus, if a < b then Ja. Also, it appears
possible to read "a is justified by b" to mean either that a is fully justified by b or that
a is partly justified by b. I intend the latter sense. It may be that a < b, although b
is not the full justification for a.
Here is a paradigm case to display the intended reading of a < b. This is a case
where a belief is justified because it is inferred from other justified beliefs. Suppose
I have a belief bl that my son is either sleeping in his room or having a snack in the
kitchen. I glance into the kitchen and, seeing he is not there, form a belief b2 that
he is not having a snack in the kitchen. Assume that Jb1 and Jb2 . From bl and b2 I
infer a belief b3 that he is sleeping in his room. Let us also assume that, because b3
is inferred in this way, Jb3 . Then in this case b3 < bl, and b3 < b2.
Hopefully this is enough to focus on an unambiguous reading of "a is justified by
b". But it should be noted that I have chosen this reading for "a < b" somewhat
arbitrarily. Other readings of "a is justified by b" could be used to state the claims
of the foundationalist. In addition, it should be kept in mind, as I said in Chapter 1,
that there is some doubt as to exactly which readings are had by "a is justified by b".
To avoid clutter, from now on I will only explicitly disambiguate sentences con-
taining the word "justified" when failing to do so may cause confusion.
2.2.2 Vanilla foundationalism
According to vanilla foundationalism,
1. For some x, Jx and there is no y such that x < y.
2. For any x and y, if x < y then Jy.
3. For any x, it is not the case that every true sentence beginning with the fragment
"x <" is entailed by a true sentence of the form
(i) "x < xl < x 2 < ..." containing an infinite number of terms, or
(ii) "x < x1 < ... < xn, < x", for some n > 0, or
(iii) "x < x".1
Vanilla foundationalist 3 may look obscure. The idea is that the vanilla foundational-
ist thinks that x, if justified, is not justified solely in virtue of being part of a circular
chain of justification, an infinite chain of justification or by being self-justifying. The
vanilla foundationalist permits circular chains of justification, infinite chains of justi-
fication and cases in which x < x. But the vanilla foundationalist thinks that these
are not sufficient to make it the case that Jx.
The scope of vanilla foundationalism may be somewhat surprising. Vanilla founda-
tionalism encompasses views that some might hesitate to call "foundationalism". For
example, a vanilla foundationalist may claim that a belief is justified just in case it
1(ii) could be omitted because this case is subsumed by (i). If some sentence like (ii) is true, then
there is a true sentence like (i) which entails it. (iii) could be omitted for the same reason.
is part of a coherent set of beliefs. According to this vanilla foundationalist, every
justified belief is basic. In addition, vanilla foundationalism excludes views that some
call "foundationalist". Some philosophers say that basic beliefs are justified solely
because they justify themselves. Vanilla foundationalism excludes this view. Thesis
3 is intended to rule out this possibility. I am motivated to present foundationalism
in this somewhat unusual way in order to mark out the class of views susceptible to
coming argument.
Some additional remarks about these three theses are in order.
First, some foundationalists who appear to reject 1 and 2 are best seen as vanilla
foundationalists. For example, some philosophers say that when a perceptual belief is
justified, it is justified by experience, but experience is not the kind of thing that can
be justified.2 While vanilla foundationalists think that basic things are justified but
not justified by anything, these foundationalists say that basic things are experiences
which neither are nor can be justified. This is an interesting view; however, it is
misleadingly described. These foundationalists say that some justified beliefs are
justified by other justified beliefs. These foundationalists also say that some justified
beliefs are justified by experience. But clearly these philosophers don't think that
what makes a belief justified, when justified by a belief, is the same as what makes a
belief justified, when justified by an experience. For one thing, when justified belief
bl is justified by belief b2 that is thought to be, in part, because belief b2 is justified.
But when belief b3 is justified by experience e, the thought is not that this is because
experience e is justified. Yet, confusingly, the same locution "is justified by" appears
in describing both the belief-belief case and the belief-experience case. It seems to me
that these philosophers are helping themselves to one of the ambiguities discussed in
Chapter 1. On one reading of "a is justified by b," "by b" means "in virtue of b" or
"according to b". On another reading, "by b" means something else. For example, in
"This belief was justified by that belief by induction," only the second "by" means
"in virtue of" or "according to". It seems to me that these philosophers mean that
perceptual beliefs are justified in virtue of experience, But even if these philosophers
2See for example [54] and [60].
are not guilty of mixing up different readings of "a is justified by b", these philosophers
would avoid some murkiness by keeping the belief-belief case separate from the belief-
experience case, by reserving "is justified by" for the belief-belief case and using "is
justified in virtue of" for the belief-experience case. And, even if these philosophers
are not using "a is justified by b" ambiguously, we can bring them into the fold
of vanilla foundationalists by simply stipulating that, in the vanilla foundationalist
theses, the terms only refer to things that can be justified.
Second, the vanilla foundationalist theses are intentionally stated in an abstract
way for greater generality. What the 'x' can refer to in "Jx" depends on the details
of each vanilla foundationalist theory, in particular what kinds of things can be epis-
temically justified, according to that theory. Some epistemologists talk about beliefs
which are justified or not: John's belief that it is raining is justified; Mary's belief
that the future will be bleak is not. And there is a great deal of argument about
what it is to have a belief and whether there are any at all.3 Since many philosophers
say that believing is a relation between a person and a proposition (or a sentence),
it may be better to talk instead about a justified attitude that a person can have to
a proposition (or a sentence): Lily is justified in believing that Rome wasn't built in
a day; Hubert is not justified in believing that he is ill-paid. However, others think
that, in the first instance, what can be justified is not an attitude to a particular
proposition (or sentence) but an entire system of belief. Another view is that, in
the first instance, what can be justified are changes in an entire system of belief.4
The argument I will give should work for any vanilla foundationalist no matter her
view about what can be justified. I must admit, however, that this claim deserves
some support which I am as yet unable to give. In this chapter, for convenience, I
will speak as if beliefs are things which are justified or not. I do not intend this to
prejudice any issues.
Now that the three vanilla foundationalist theses have been clarified, the regress
argument is easy to state. The vanilla foundationalist uses 3 and the anti-skeptical
3 See [44] for some helpful discussion.
"As in [33].
premise that for some belief x, Jx, to argue that either 1 or -12. Thus, assuming 2,
1 follows. 5
2.2.3 The source of justification
Given 1, 2 and 3, it follows that, for any x, if Jx, then either x is basic,
Jx and there is no y such that x < y,
or derived:
For some yl...Yn, x < yl < ... < yn, where y, is basic.
In more vivid terms, according to the vanilla foundationalist, if some x is derived,
then x inherits its justificatory status from basic things; Jx because of one or more
basic things.
But if x is basic, what explains how or why Jx?
In the next section, I will explain why this question appears to require an answer.
After that, I will argue that attempting to provide an answer- attempting to explain
how or why basic things are justified- brings trouble. 6
2.3 Some explaining to do
2.3.1 What justifies that?
The conclusion of the regress argument is that some things are basic. However, the
regress argument does not reveal what kinds of things are basic, or how it can be that
basic things are justified. Being a good philosopher, the vanilla foundationalist (call
her "the theorist") goes beyond the regress argument. She does not merely claim that
5Described this way, the regress argument is closely connected to the Agrippan argument of
Chapter 1: 3 is Premise III; 2 is equivalent to Premise IIbb; 1 is the negation of Premise Ib.
6Foundationalists may wish to accept that basic things can be justified, simultaneously, in two
different ways, a "basic way" and a "non-basic way". (This was suggested to me by R. Feldman. [p.c.])
Call this redundant foundationalism. A redundant foundationalist could, for example, think that
basic belief b is justified in the basic way in virtue of its relation to experience; but that b could,
at the same time, also be justified in the non-basic way by other beliefs. As stated, the vanilla
foundationalist theses rule out redundant foundationalism. Despite this, redundant foundationalism
is also subject to the coming argument. To see this, readers should keep in mind the relevant
question for this form of foundationalism: "But if x is basic, what explains how or why Jx in the
basic way?"
there are some basic things. She attempts to explain what makes it the case that the
basic things are justified- what makes it the case that Jx when there is no y such
that x < y. To fail to.provide an explanation would be to fail to fully articulate the
foundationalist theory. To fail to provide an explanation would leave the nature of
the basic things mysterious to us; we would be left with the bare claim that there are
some.
The following story shows the trouble facing the theorist who fails to provide an
explanation. Suppose that the theorist believes that one of Bill's beliefs is justified
but is such that nothing justifies it. If a doubter asks "What justifies that?", the
theorist responds, "As I said, nothing justifies that." But the doubter can persist:
"No, I didn't mean to ask what justifies Bill's belief. I meant: what justifies your
belief that Bill's belief is justified, but is such that nothing justifies it?" This is a
different question. The theorist could try to answer by arguing that there are basic
things, without attempting to explain how or why Jx when x is basic. Unfortunately,
that response leaves the doubter's question unanswered. Why should the theorist
believe that that belief of Bill's is justified? Why should the theorist believe that that
belief of Bill's is basic? And, more generally, what makes it the case that the basic
things are justified? Stopping at the bare claim leaves the nature of the basic things
mysterious to us.
Even more, stopping at the bare claim leaves the theorist vulnerable to skeptical
worries. Derived beliefs are supposed to inherit their justificatory status from basic
things. If the theorist says nothing about what makes it the case that Jx when x is
basic, then we might well doubt that there are any basic things, and so doubt whether
there are any justified beliefs.
Of course, vanilla foundaticnalism may be correct, although the theorist provides
no explanation of what makes it the case that basic things are justified. For suppose
that the theorist does not or cannot provide an explanation of what makes it that
case that basic things are justified. Even so, that need not show that there are no
basic things. That Bill's belief is justified need not depend on the availability to the
theorist of an explanation. In fact, it would be rather surprising to discover that the
theorist's theoretical skill determines whether Bill's beliefs are justified. (Set aside
odd cases like the beliefs that Bill gains after reading the theorist's latest philosophical
tract. The theorist's theoretical skill may partly determine whether those beliefs are
justified.)
Foundationalists indeed attempt to dispel the mystery, accepting the task of ex-
plaining how it is that basic things are justified, that is, what makes it the case that
Jx, if x is basic. Here are three examples:
1. if X has a belief b that was formed by an unconditionally reliable process, then
Jb.[28]
2. if X has a belief b, then, prima facie, Jb.[33]
3. if X has an experience with content p, then, prima facie,
J(X's believing p).[54]
In each of the three examples, the foundationalist is trying to explain what makes it
the case that a basic thing is justified. For instance, according to 1. being formed by
an unconditionally reliable process makes it the case that a basic belief is justified. It
should be emphasized that the foundationalist has wide latitude in formulating her
explanation. For example, the explanation may be externalist (as in 1) or not. Or
the basic things may be thought to be indefeasibly justified (as in 1) or not.
2.3.2 Why give an explanation?
I just offered several sketchy reasons why the foundationalist should explain what
makes it the case that Jx, when x is basic. First, absent such an explanation, the
foundationalist theory is not fully spelled out. Second, the bare claim that there are
some basic things is rather mysterious. The theorist ought to dispel the mystery.
Third, the lack of an explanation might lead one to doubt that there are any basic
things, and so doubt whether there are any justified beliefs. Fourth, to a claim that
b is justified, the doubter's question "What justifies that?" has force that is not fully
answered by "Nothing justifies b."
These reasons are interrelated; perhaps they are not even distinct. Despite their
sketchiness, together they suggest that something more general can be said here: a
theorist who lacks an explanation is being unreasonable somehow.
As a first stab, I propose to locate the unreasonableness in the following way:
(RO) A person with a reasonable belief b can offer an adequate consideration in
favor of b.
If (RO) is correct, then we can diagnose what goes wrong when the theorist fails
to give an explanation. Suppose that the theorist believes that a is a justified belief,
but nothing justifies it. If the theorist has an explanation of what makes it the case
that a is justified, then the theorist has an adequate consideration in favor of her
belief that a is justified. She can say: if circumstances are such-and-such a way, then
a is justified; and circumstances are that way.
But if the theorist has no explanation, what consideration can she offer in favor of
her belief that a is justified? The theorist, in answer to the question "What justifies
that?", could simply say "Nothing justifies that; it just is justified." But this is hardly
an adequate answer. "Nothing justifies that; it just is justified" is not, by itself, an
adequate consideration in favor of a belief that something is justified. And without
an explanation, the theorist apparently has no other answer to offer.
So, if (RO) is correct, we can diagnose what goes wrong when the theorist fails to
give an explanation. Moreover, something like (RO) indeed seems correct. Imagine
that a belief that it is raining in Santa Fe pops into Suzy's head. But suppose that
Suzy cannot offer any consideration in favor of that belief. When asked why she
believes that it is raining in Sante Fe, she replies "I believe it for no reason." Suzy
seems unreasonable. She should at least be able to offer some consideration. She
could say, "I had some reason but I can't remember what it is." Or "I trust the
things that pop into my head." But if Suzy can say nothing beyond "I believe it for
no reason," her belief seems unreasonable.7
(RO) says nothing about justification. This is by design. Since (RO) says nothing
about justification, (RO) makes no explicit controversial claim about justification.
(RO) does not, for example, say that a person with a justified belief can justify that
belief. Neither does (RO) say that if a person is justified in believing that p, then she
7cf. L. Bonjour's example of a reliable clairvoyant in [11]. Bonjour takes his example to support
a very different claim than the one I am defending.
is justified in believing that she is justified in believing that p. These claims about
justification are very controversial, and likely unacceptable to adherents of certain
accounts of justified belief. For example, if being justified in a belief is a matter of
having used a reliable belief forming process, then it would be surprising if a person
with a justified belief can always justify that belief; it would be surprising for a person
always to have access to what it is in virtue of which his justified belief has that status.
I intend my argument to apply to any form of vanilla foundationalism, thus I am
trying to remain neutral about accounts of justification. The term "reasonable" helps
make this neutrality clearer, even for those philosophers who think that a reasonable
belief simply is a justified belief.
Some may object that (RO) is too strong. Even so, everyone, I believe, can agree
that at least some beliefs, in order to be reasonable, require the presence of supporting
considerations. Perhaps this does not hold true for all beliefs. Perhaps small children
and animals have reasonable beliefs without being able to offer considerations in
favor of them. Perhaps it is even reasonable for us ordinary folks to merely shrug our
shoulders in response to a question "What justifies that?" Still, we can agree that a
theorist should be in a position to say at least something in favor of her theoretical
beliefs. (A theoretical belief is, for example, a belief that some other belief is justified.)
For a theorist, at least, embarrassed silence in theoretical matters is not satisfactory.
Let us weaken (RO) to make it- hopefully- acceptable to all:
(R) A theorist with a reasonable theoretical belief b can offer an adequate con-
sideration in favor of b.
(R) is very weak. (R) says that a theorist ought to be in a position to offer an
adequate consideration in favor of certain of her beliefs. What counts as an adequate
consideration can be something very weak. For example, Suzy's reply that she had
some reason, but can't remember it, seems to be a consideration both weak and
adequate.
Although (R) is weak, it is not vacuous. An irrelevant remark does not count
as an adequate consideration in favor of a belief. If Suzy says "I believe it because
lemons are yellow", we would not reckon her belief reasonable. What counts as an
adequate consideration in favor of a belief? That is a significant question which I
am not sure how to answer. I believe, however, that the cases I will consider here
are clear enough to allow reliance on intuitive considerations in distinguishing an
adequate consideration from an inadequate consideration.
At this point, the reader may suspect that I have not answered the question with
which I began. I was trying to explain why the foundationalist is being unreasonable
who goes no further than the bare claim that there are basic things. I then suggested
that a theorist who believes that some thing b is basic lacks adequate consideration
in favor of her belief, unless she has an explanation of what makes it the case that Jx
when x is basic. But there is a difference between believing that a particular thing b
is basic, and believing the bare claim that there are basic things. The foundationalist
who believes that there are basic things does have a consideration to offer in favor of
that belief: the regress argument. Why is the foundationalist who stops at the bare
claim being unreasonable?
The answer, I believe, comes in two steps. First, it is unreasonable for the theorist
to believe the bare claim that there are basic things without a plausible instance,
some thing which is plausibly basic. But, in order to provide a plausible instance,
the theorist needs to believe of some thing that it is basic. Second, it is unreasonable
to believe of some thing that it is basic without an explanation of what makes it the
case that Jx when x is basic.
The second step is explained by condition (R). The first step is not explained by
condition (R), for the regress argument is, apparently, an adequate consideration in
favor of a belief in the bare claim. I admit that I do not have a satisfactory argument
for the first step. Even so, there is intuitive force behind thinking that in some cases
it is unreasonable to believe an existential claim without a plausible instance. You
wouldn't feel satisfied to believe that there are some leprechauns just because the old
stories say so. You'd want to see one. Now I certainly don't mean to commit myself
to a general principle that it is unreasonable to believe an existential claim without
a plausible instance. Such a general principle seems false: you might reasonably be
convinced that there are numbers too big for you to write down in your lifetime,
without having a plausible instance of such a number. In contrast, the bare claim is
offered as the conclusion of a very controversial argument, not a mathematical proof.
That makes it seem appropriate to demand a plausible instance. I will take it as
a working assumption that the first step is indeed correct. Things will need to be
rethought if we find reason to think that it is incorrect.
To summarize: the foundationalist needs an explanation for what makes it the
case that a basic thing is justified. This need is (in part) explained by condition (R).
2.4 Obscure foundationalism
2.4.1 The argument
Suppose the theorist offers an explanation of what makes it that case that Jx when
x is basic.
Suppose also that the theorist, being a good theorist, is reflective about her theoretical
beliefs. For example, she not only believes in her explanation, she believes that this
belief is justified. Call her explanation 'T', and her belief in T, 'bT'. The theorist
further believes that Jb-r.
One day, the theorist starts thinking about this last belief of hers; she starts
wondering whether JbT. The theorist has no particular reason to doubt that J1b.
She is simply wondering whether it really is the case that JbT. I believe that this
is something a theorist should do; a theorist should be reflective, and a reflective
theorist should sometimes wonder about her own theoretical beliefs. Is this correct?
Should a theorist be reflective in the way I am suggesting? I will take this question up
later.8 For now, let us see what ensues when we assume that this theorist, believing
that JbT, starts wondering whether it is the case that Jbr. Note, to be clear, the
theorist is thinking about her own beliefs, not anyone else's.
As discussed in the last section,
1. Only if she relies on br can the theorist offer an adequate consideration in favor
sThat I should take up this question suggests that a theorist should indeed sometimes wonder
about theoretical beliefs.
of her belief that some things are basic.
For we are assuming that it is unreasonable to believe the bare claim that there are
basic things without a plausible instance, some thing which is plausibly basic. But in
order to provide a plausible instance, the theorist needs to offer a particular b which
is plausibly basic. However, the theorist can't reasonably believe of some particular
thing b that it is basic without relying on bT.
Let me go through this last step carefully. Suppose the theorist believes of some
particular b that it is basic. That is, she believes that Jb but there is no y such that
b < y. If so, then she can offer no y such that b < y as a consideration in favor of
her belief that Jb. For she believes that there is no such y. The only consideration
she has to offer involves her explanation of what makes it the case that a basic thing
is justified. So she needs to rely on bT to offer an adequate consideration in favor of
Jb.9
An example will help make this clearer. Suppose Herman is a vanilla founda-
tionalist who believes that perceptual beliefs can be basic, and are justified when
experience is appropriately connected to the perceptual belief. For example, suppose,
looking in a mirror, Herman comes to believe that his nose is red. Call this belief bl.
According to Herman's theory, although justified, bl is not justified by anything. It is
Herman's visual experience which makes it the case that bl is justified. I am arguing
that if Herman has a further belief b2 that bl is basic, then only if he relies on his
explanation can Herman offer an adequate consideration in favor of b2. For if Herman
believes that bl is justified but not justified by anything, then what consideration can
he offer in favor of his belief that bl is justified without involving his explanation
of how it could be that something is justified without being justified by anything?
Herman could say, "Well, my nose just looks red. That's my reason for believing
that it is red." While that reason may support or explain why Herman accepts bl,
the question is not what consideration can he offer in support of bl. The question
9Strictly speaking, belief in T*, a rival explanation to T, would also give her something to say.
So it is not bT, in particular, that she needs, but a belief in some explanation. Noting this does not
affect the argument. We can presume that the theorist did not start out believing in both of two
rival explanations, T and T*.
is what consideration can he offer in support of the higher order belief b2 that bl is
justified. And given that Herman thinks that bl is basic, it is difficult to see how his
nose looking red could be for Herman an adequate consideration in favor of b2. For
one thing, Herman cannot think that this reason justifies bl because he thinks that
bl is not justified by anything. Of course if Herman adds that experiences of the way
things look can make it the case that a perceptual belief is justified, then Herman
does appear to have an adequate consideration in favor of b2. But this is to bring in
his explanation of how it can be that basic things are justified."'
Now, given (R),
(R) A theorist with a reasonable belief can offer an adequate consideration in
favor of that belief,
it follows from 1 that
2. If the theorist does not rely on bT, then it is unreasonable for her to believe
that some things are basic.
And, more surprisingly, given that the theorist does believe that some things are
basic,
3. If the theorist does not rely on bT, then many- perhaps most- of her beliefs
are unreasonable.
To see this, suppose that the theorist does not rely on bT. Then, for any thing x, if
she believes that x is basic, then her belief is unreasonable. As just noted, without
bT, she has nothing adequate to say in favor of her belief that x is basic. And the
theorist's belief that there are basic things is also unreasonable (given our assumption
that it is unreasonable for the theorist to believe the bare claim that there are basic
things without a plausible instance.)
10A curious artifact of Herman's theory permits Herman to persist along the following lines: "That
it looks that way is a consideration in favor of bl although it does not justify bl. Still, that means
that I have a non-justifying consideration in favor of belief bl. That there is such a non-justifying
consideration is a reason to believe that bl is justified. So I have a reason to believe that bl is
justified." I find this reasoning suspicious: why is the presence of a non-justifying consideration a
reason to believe bl is justified? And what is a non-justifying consideration anyway? But even if
this reasoning is accepted, the real problem comes because the theorist is wondering whether her
explanation is justified. If Herman is wondering whether his belief (that experiences make perceptual
beliefs justified) is justified, then it is illegitimate for him to offer his experience as a consideration
in favor of believing that a perceptual belief is justified. For he is wondering whether he is justified
in believing that experiences can be such considerations! I will explain this further when I reach
step 4.
Worse, the unreasonableness affects certain beliefs about her non-basic beliefs.
For each belief x of hers, if she believes that x is non-basic, and believes that x is
justified, then her belief that x is justified is unreasonable. For the theorist is a vanilla
foundationalist. She believes that if some x is a non-basic belief, then x inherits its
justificatory status from basic things; Jx because of one or more basic things. But
she has nothing adequate to say in favor of a belief that some thing is basic. So she
has nothing adequate to say in favor of a belief that some non-basic belief is justified.
Even worse, the unreasonableness in these beliefs about her non-basic beliefs may
infect further beliefs. Arguably, unreasonableness in a belief about a belief can infect
the lower order belief: if b2 is a belief that bl is justified, and b2 is unreasonable, then
bl is unreasonable too. In other words, if the theorist's beliefs about the justificatory
status of other beliefs are unreasonable, then those other beliefs are arguably unrea-
sonable too. Whether and how further beliefs are affected depends on how (R) is
spelled out, and how reflective the theorist is. If (R) applies not only to theoretical
beliefs but to other beliefs as well, then those other beliefs will be unreasonable too.
And since a belief will not be "poisoned" unless the theorist has an unreasonable
higher order belief about its epistemic status, the number of lower order beliefs af-
fected depends on what higher order beliefs are held. An unreflective person may
have few beliefs about her beliefs. The theorist, however, is presumably different.
The reflective theorist should have many beliefs about the epistemic status of her be-
liefs. The more reflective the theorist is, the greater the number of her unreasonable
beliefs.
Thus, while wondering whether JbT, either many of the theorist's beliefs are un-
reasonable, or she relies on bT. But she should not rely on bT while wondering:
4. The theorist should not, at the same time, wonder whether JbT, and rely on
br.
To do so would be to endorse an illegitimate kind of circularity. This circularity can
be displayed by example. Suppose Amy believes that God makes it the case that
beliefs about God are justified. Call this belief bl. Suppose Amy also believes that bl
is justified. Call this belief b2. Suppose Amy wonders about b2 ; she wonders whether
bl is indeed justified. She surely would not be satisfied if she thinks to herself "Well,
since bl is a belief about God, and God makes it the case that beliefs about God are
justified, then b, is justified." For that would be to use what she believes as a premise
in an argument concluding that her belief is justified. To be sure, the unacceptability
of Amy's reasoning does not show that her beliefs are false or unjustified. If God does
make it the case that beliefs about God are justified, then her belief b, is both true
and justified. Still, her reasoning should not satisfy her wondering; it should certainly
not renew her confidence that b, is justified.
Similarly, if the theorist is wondering whether JbT she should not be satisfied by
reasoning which relies on bT. Recall the plight of Herman. Herman believes that his
nose is red, and he believes that this perceptual belief is basic. And suppose Herman
is also wondering whether he is justified in believing that experiences can make it the
case that perceptual beliefs are justified. While wondering, Herman should not offer
his experience ("Well, it looks red to me") as a consideration in favor of his belief that
this perceptual belief is justified. For he is wondering whether he justifiably believes
that experiences can do that."
Thus, while wondering whether JbT, either many- perhaps most- of the theorist's
beliefs are unreasonable, or she illegitimately relies on bT.
I do not believe that this conclusion shows that vanilla foundationalism is false
or incorrect. However, I think the conclusion does show that there is something very
unsatisfying about vanilla foundationalism, even if it is true. The vanilla foundation-
alist should be able to satisfactorily resolve her wondering. She should be able to
satisfy herself that her theoretical beliefs are correct. But she cannot offer an ade-
"The circularity I am describing resembles what W. Alston calls epistemic circularity. A person is
justified in believing the premises of an epistemically circular argument only if the conclusion is true.
(See [2] and [6]. Also, see [60] for a different understanding of epistemic circularity.) It has come
to my attention that in recent unpublished work, M. Bergmann[9] has argued that foundationalism
brings commitment to epistemic circularity, and that since foundationalism is a better theory than
its competitors, epistemic circularity is sometimes benign. Like Alston, Bergmann is concerned to
explain how we know (or are justified in believing) that sense perception is reliable, and to do so
without recourse to a malignant epistemic circularity. Inspired by Reid, Bergmann claims that it is a
first principle that sense perception is reliable, and we have a faculty of common sense that enables
us to know first principles non-inferentially. Whatever the merits of Bergmann's claim, it won't
help here; it is doubtful that we have a rational faculty that "sees" the correctness of a theoretical
explanation of what makes basic things justified.
quate consideration in favor of her belief that bT is justified, without illegitimately
relying on bT.
Let me try to get clearer about what the problem is.
2.4.2 What went wrong: dramatic version
Here is a brief, although misleading, version of the argument just presented:
The question "What justifies that?" can be asked of any belief. Does
that question always require an answer which leads to a further question?
The foundationalist says "No". The foundationalist argues that at some
point the questions stop. When we reach a basic thing, the foundation-
alist response is: "Nothing justifies that; it just is justified". The trail
of questions ends at that basic thing; there are no more things left to
question.
If "What justifies that?", when asked of any belief, requires an answer,
then beliefs about beliefs can be questioned too: for example, a belief
that some thing is basic- justified but not justified by anything. So the
foundationalist is driven to posit T, an explanation how it can be that
basic things are justified.
If "What justifies that?", when asked of any belief, deserves an answer,
then the belief that a belief in T is justified can be questioned too. That
begins another line of questioning. But if a belief in T cannot be brought
in, that line of questioning reaches a point where the theorist has no
answer.
Although dramatic, this version of the argument is misleading. In the original
version, the theorist wonders about one of her theoretical beliefs. She is not defending
her belief in answer to a challenge. She is not trying to convince someone else to
change his mind. She is not trying to satisfy a doubt about her belief. The issue is
not whether she has what it takes to answer a challenge, or to convince someone else,
or to satisfy a doubt. Instead, the issue is whether, in wondering about her beliefs,
she can feel satisfied that all is well. I claim that the answer is no. She eventually
reaches a point where she needs to rely on bT, but she should not do so because she
is wondering whether bT is justified.
Here is an analogy to explain what I am mean about wondering, and how it differs
from doubting or answering a challenge. Suppose, before going to bed, I look into my
child's room to see if he is ok. In the darkness, I see a vague form curled up in the
corner of the crib, and no sign that anything is amiss. I go to bed satisfied. I had no
doubt or suspicion that something was wrong. Nor was I am trying to get evidence
to answer a person who believes that something is wrong. Otherwise, I might turn
the lights on or tickle him to see if he responds. Instead, I am satisfied by finding
just a little evidence that all is well. I am looking for reassurance, but of a very weak
sort.
The problem is that the theorist can't even get that weak sort of reassurance. To
be satisfied when wondering whether p, in the sense I am discussing, is to be satisfied
that there is at least a weak consideration in favor of continuing to believe that p.
Unfortunately for the theorist, she cannot get that satisfaction without illegitimately
bringing in her belief bT.
2.4.3 What the argument does not show
This is not a skeptical argument. The conclusion is not: the theorist's beliefs are
not justified. This is not a skeptical argument, even if wondering temporarily defeats
the justification of some of her beliefs. For the theorist can easily and reasonably
stop wondering. For example, she might, quite reasonably, think to herself that she
is wasting her time wondering whether JbT, and stop wondering whether JbT. And
when she stops wondering, the temporarily defeated justification will presumably
come back.
Neither is the conclusion that the theorist's beliefs are not reasonable. Wondering
temporarily makes many- or most- of her beliefs unreasonable. But she can easily and
reasonably stop wondering. And when she stops wondering her beliefs will presumably
become reasonable again.
2.4.4 What the argument shows
I believe that the argument shows that vanilla foundationalism, when coupled with
an explanation T, does not sustain reflection. A vanilla foundationalist who critically
scrutinizes her theoretical beliefs cannot satisfy herself that they are correct. She can-
not find even a weak consideration to satisfy herself that her belief in her explanation
T is justified, without illegitimately bringing in her explanation T.
Someone might rush to deny that this is a problem:
If a person starts wondering about his entire epistemological theory, many-
or most- of his beliefs may be called into question. And he may not be
able to satisfactorily answer all questions which arise, without appealing
to his epistemological theory. But surely this does not show that his epis-
temological theory is flawed. Similarly, if a vanilla foundationalist starts
wondering whether a belief in T is justified, many- or most- of her beliefs
may be called into question. And she may not be able to satisfactorily
answer all questions which arise, without appealing to T. But surely this
does not show that vanilla foundationalism is flawed.
We should not conclude from the argument that vanilla foundationalism
is flawed. Instead, we should conclude that wondering about T is like
wondering about an entire epistemological theory.
In response: even if we accept the objector's claim that nothing is amiss when
a theorist wondering about his entire epistemological theory finds himself unable to
answer all questions which arise, it is clear that the present case is different. In
the present case, the vanilla foundationalist is not wondering about vanilla founda-
tionalism. She accepts vanilla foundationalism on the basis of the regress argument.
She is not questioning her commitment to vanilla foundationalism. Rather, she is
considering a further question that arises once vanilla foundationalism is accepted.
That question- what makes a basic thing justified- does not even arise for non-
foundationalist theories. Vanilla foundationalists can, and do, argue about the merits
of rival answers to that question independently of acceptance of vanilla foundational-
ism. The problem is that the vanilla foundationalist cannot be satisfied by her answer
to that further question.
2.4.5 Four solutions
I see four possible ways out for the vanilla foundationalist.
The first way out is to offer an explanation T, but refrain from wondering whether
or not a belief in T is justified. If the theorist refrains from wondering, then she will
never find herself in the unsatisfactory position I have described. This way out seems
rather closed-minded. Surely, it is part of the theoretical project to reflect on one's
theoretical beliefs. But even if there is nothing unreasonable or closed-minded about
refraining from wondering whether or not her belief in T is justified, this response
leaves the theorist no better off. For if the theorist were to wonder, and thought hard
enough, she would recognize her unsatisfactory position: not being able to offer an
adequate consideration in favor of her belief that her belief in T is justified. It does
not help to advise her to refrain from wondering about her theoretical beliefs. That's
like advising: "You should accept foundationalism- just don't think about it too
hard."
The second way out is to hold no beliefs about the epistemic status of other
beliefs. In that case, there would be nothing for the theorist to wonder about. I don't
think there is anything unreasonable about this way out. There are pfobably many
reasonable people who hold no beliefs about the epistemic status of other beliefs. Not
everyone is a philosopher. However, no one who takes this way out can believe in
foundationalism, because believing in foundationalism requires holding beliefs about
the epistemic status of other beliefs. To take this way out is to say something like:
"Vanilla foundationalism is true but you shouldn't believe in it."
The third way out is to embrace the circularity I have identified. The theorist
then says that, while wondering whether JbT, she may legitimately rely on bT. This
way out is unacceptable to the theorist. It undermines the reasons to be a vanilla
foundationalist. The theorist rejects coherentism; she argues for her view partly on
the grounds that circular chains of justification do not suffice to confer justification.
But to take this way out is, if not to endorse coherentism outright, at least to hold a
view difficult to distinguish from coherentism. If the theorist relies on bT in satisfying
herself that JbT, then she uses one of her beliefs as a consideration in favor of her
belief that that belief is justified. But if a belief b is a consideration in favor of a
belief that b is justified, then b is a consideration in favor of b. (For a consideration
in favor of a belief that b is justified, is a consideration in favor of a belief that b is
true or likely to be true.) If b can be a consideration in favor of b, then I have trouble
seeing why the theorist would deny that b can justify itself.
The fourth and final way out is more promising. The theorist could maintain that,
even while wondering about her belief in T, she can offer an adequate consideration
in favor of a belief that a belief is basic: a belief that a belief is basic is itself basic.
What adequate consideration has the theorist in favor of that? A belief that a belief
that a belief is basic is basic is basic. And so on. The theorist thus does not violate
(R) while wondering about her belief in T.
However, if the theorist chooses this last way out, she loses her motivation for
proposing a T in the first place. I suggested that a T is needed in order to satisfy
(R) when the theorist believes of some b that it is basic. If (R) can be satisfied by
bringing in a basic higher order belief than a T is not needed. To take this way out is
to be satisfied to be an obscure foundationalist- a vanilla foundationalist who refrains
from offering an explanation why Jx when x is basic.
I must admit that obscure foundationalism is strange, and rather difficult to en-
dorse. I expect that you agree. But, short of abjuring vanilla foundationalism, I see
no better way out. If we wish to be vanilla foundationalists, we should be obscure
foundationalists. So to the extent that obscure foundationalism is unsatisfactory,
vanilla foundationalism is too.
Part II
The practical problem of
skepticism

Chapter 3
You can't get there from here
Abstract
Rational acts are guided by beliefs. This observation supports a response to skepti-
cism: some skeptical arguments can be rationally avoided.
Introduction: the problem of skepticism
Skeptical arguments are tantalizing. Skeptical arguments display apparently com-
pelling reasoning to implausible conclusions such as
No one can know anything about other minds,
or
No one can have a justified belief about the external world.
A few philosophers accept skepticism. The rest face a question about each skeptical
argument: What is wrong with that argument? Suggested answers abound: that
argument begs the question, exhibits a misleading form of context sensitivity, has
false premises, appeals to implausible epistemic principles, fails to transmit warrant
from premises to conclusion, and so on. Some philosophers just hope that each
argument has a defect. Whatever the approach, non-skeptics agree that all skeptical
arguments are flawed.
Just two options seem available: accept skepticism in some form, or agree that
every skeptical argument is flawed. One must either become a skeptic or face the
problem of satisfactorily explaining what is wrong with each skeptical argument.
There is a third path. One need not choose between becoming a skeptic or ac-
cepting the problem of locating flaws in each skeptical argument. I will argue that it
is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments.
I am not alone on the third path. Hume, for example, can be seen as a non-
skeptic who does not look for flaws in each skeptical argument. Instead, Hume claims
that humans are psychologically immune to skepticism. However, Hume's views are
difficult to interpret. It is not clear whether he offers a stable non-skeptical position.
The difficulties facing a Hume-like response to skepticism are vividly seen by
considering a proposal by P. F. Strawson.[61] Inspired by Hume, Strawson claims
that, by nature, we cannot become skeptics. Thus, thinks Strawson, skepticism is
idle. It is idle to seriously entertain skeptical arguments, and it is idle to rationally
confront skeptical arguments: "... skeptical arguments and counter-arguments [are]
equally idle- not senseless, but idle- since what we have here are original, natural,
inescapable commitments which we neither choose nor could give up."[61, p 27-8]
Strawson is concerned with skepticism about external bodies, other minds, the past,
and the use of induction; he is claiming that our commitments to the use of induction,
the existence of external bodies and so on, are commitments that we, by nature,
cannot give up.
Interpreted rather bluntly, Strawson's central claim is that nothing can bring us
to give up our "natural, inescapable commitments". Since skeptical arguments aim
to do just that, skeptical arguments cannot succeed. If skeptical arguments cannot
succeed, then it is idle to seriously entertain a skeptical argument, and it is idle to
try to refute a skeptical argument.
This approach to skepticism faces a difficulty. Suppose I can't help believing that
the FBI is out to get me. When faced with an apparently compelling argument to the
contrary, I dismiss the argument as "idle". I seem unreasonable. Similarly, suppose
I can't help believing that some skeptical conclusion is false. When faced with an
apparently compelling skeptical argument to the contrary, I dismiss the argument as
"idle". Again, I seem unreasonable. The problem here is that it seems unreasonable
to dismiss an argument simply because one cannot help believing that the conclusion
is false.
In later writing, Strawson appears, sensibly, to reject the blunt interpretation of
his view:
It is not merely a matter of dismissing the demand for justification of
one's belief in a proposition on the ground that one can't help believing
it. That would be weak indeed. The position is, rather, that the demand
for justification is really senseless. [30, p 370]
To explain the point, Strawson adopts an image from Wittgenstein's On Certainty.[72,
§96-§99] According to Strawson, our "natural inescapable commitments" are like the
banks of a river; they constitute "the boundary conditions of the exercise of our
critical and rational competence..." [30, p 371] The notion of a boundary condition
is suggestive, but obscure. What is a boundary condition of rational competence?
Further, why think that, for example, a commitment to the existence of external
bodies is such a boundary condition? Admittedly, Strawson's suggestion is briefly
sketched- but one would prefer a more transparent proposal.
Perhaps ambitiously, I will attempt a better response to skepticism. A Humean
suggestion is that some beliefs cannot be given up. However, the mere fact that
a belief cannot be given up seems insufficient reason to ignore an argument to the
contrary. Strawson adds Wittgensteinian complexity: some commitments can neither
be given up nor intelligibly questioned. But this thought is obscure. I will defend a
simpler claim: some beliefs cannot be given up, while acting rationally. From this
claim, I will argue that, ordinarily, no one, while acting rationally, can be convinced
by certain skeptical arguments. And I will conclude that, to avoid acting irrationally,
it is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments.
3.1 The plan
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I clarify the concept of lasting
belief. In section 3.3, I claim that rational acts require lasting beliefs. Then, in section
3.4, I use this claim to argue that, ordinarily, no one, while acting rationally, can be
convinced by a skeptical argument. I proceed by first describing a certain extreme
kind of skeptical argument, and arguing that no one, while acting rationally, can be
convinced by an extreme skeptical argument. Then I argue that this result extends,
in a weaker form, to other skeptical arguments. In section 3.5, I distinguish the
proposal from superficially similar anti-skeptical proposals. After that, in section 3.6,
I present an argument for the key claim of this approach to skepticism- that rational
acts require lasting beliefs. In section 3.7, I reply to some objections. Finally, I draw
some conclusions about the problem of skepticism, and list some questions for future
research.
3.2 Lasting belief
Some beliefs last longer than others. If Wallace and Gromit both believe that their
tenant is honest, but Gromit will soon change his mind, then Wallace's belief will last
longer than Gromit's. If the rock that is about to land on W. E. Coyote's head will
cause him to lose a few dozen beliefs, then those beliefs will not last long.
These are claims about the length of time that a belief will last. In claiming that
Smith's belief will last three days (or three months or until the next full moon) I
am making a claim about the length of time that Smith will continue to hold that
belief. But, it should be emphasized, I am not making a claim about the robustness
of Smith's belief, or the tenacity with which Smith holds that belief, or the belief
revision policy Smith adopts, or Smith's beliefs about what he will believe. To avoid
misunderstandings, I will explain why.
1. Robust belief
A person's belief is robust just in case he would not easily give up that belief.' But
even if Nora robustly believes that Nestor is loyal, her belief might not last long. For
she might be about to give up her belief; she might be about to face incontrovertible
evidence of Nestor's treachery. Or, Nora may have beliefs that are very long lasting
but not at all robust. Even if, with the slightest prodding, she would stop believing
that her life has meaning, if she will never be so prodded, then that belief will last as
long as any other belief she has.
2. Stubborn belief
Eeyore may decide to stubbornly hold on to a belief. That may make his belief
last longer. But it need not. For he may soon give up his stubborn attitude, and then
his belief. Or, despite his stubborn attitude, he may soon find himself giving up the
belief anyway.
3. Belief about what one will believe
Herman may believe that Longfellow was a literary lion, and Herman may believe
that next year he will continue to believe that Longfellow was a literary lion. Still,
these beliefs may not last long. For Herman may read Evangeline tomorrow and
change his mind, both about his future beliefs and about Longfellow. Moreover,
Herman may have a long-lasting belief that Longfellow was a literary lion, but not
have any belief at all about what he will believe about Longfellow next year. 2
4. Conservatism
According to a conservative belief revision policy, a person should continue be-
lieving something as long as she finds no reason to doubt it.3 Perhaps someone who
follows a conservative belief revision policy has longer lasting beliefs than someone
who does not. But perhaps not. Even if Emma continues to believe things that she
finds no reason to doubt, she may regularly find reasons to doubt her beliefs; many
of her beliefs might not last long.
'This formulation comes from [68].
2See [27] for recent discussion about beliefs about future beliefs.
3This formulation comes from [32, p 231.
3.3 Rational acts require lasting beliefs
You begin typing an e-mail. As you reach the end of the message, you look back
and notice that some words at the beginning have vanished. "A computer glitch,"
you mumble to yourself, while making corrections. Then you notice that some other
words have disappeared. Frustrated, you type them again. Then you notice that
some more words are gone...
Could you compose a coherent message? Living a life with short-lived beliefs
would be like trying to compose a coherent e-mail with this computer. Could you
behave reasonably if beliefs disappear just when you need them?
To make this thought more explicit, I propose the following constraint on rational
action:
Principle (R) A person's act is rational only if she has a belief when that act is
initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
Note that (R) is a rather weak claim. (R) does not single out which belief must last
long enough. (R) just says that some belief must last long enough.
Here is an example to suggest that we should agree to (R).
1. Believing that if P then Q, you come to believe that P. You then start
to put these beliefs together. In the midst of your reasoning, you suddenly
stop believing that P. Still, you continue on, and conclude your reasoning
by forming a belief that Q.
This, I believe, is irrational. It is irrational for you to form the belief that Q on
the basis of this deliberation. The problem is clear: You no longer believe that P at
the end of your reasoning. At the last step of your reasoning you come to believe
that Q, but you need to believe that P at this moment for it to be rational for you
to come to believe that Q in this way. Your deliberation is not rational because your
belief that P fails to last long enough. If a deliberation is a kind of act (a mental
act?), then that act is irrational because your belief that P fails to last until that act
is finished.
Some may quibble. For example, does rationality demand that, during your de-
liberation, you continuously believe that P, or can you waver between believing that
P and not? Perhaps you can waver, as long as you believe that P at the end point
of the deliberation. Although this and other complaints may bring us to tinker with
(R) let me set this and other worries aside until sections 3.6 and 3.7, where I will
scrutinize (R) more carefully. For now, I will suppose that this example shows (R)-
or something very much like it- to be a reasonable hypothesis.
Other examples support (R). For instance:
2. One evening I develop a mild headache. Unfortunately, there is no
aspirin in my home. I wonder if the pharmacy is open. It is not a very
strong headache, and it is a long way to the pharmacy, so it wouldn't
be worth going out only to find the pharmacy closed. A glance at my
watch tells me that it's 8:45. I conclude that the pharmacy is open, and
decide to go there. On the way, I notice that the street looks empty, and
I wonder if the pharmacy is still open. I glance at my watch. It still says
8:45. I realize that my watch has stopped long ago. I decide that I was
mistaken to believe that the pharmacy was open, and I start believing
that the pharmacy is closed. Then I continue going there.
This behavior is irrational. My decision to go to the pharmacy required the belief
that it was open. When this belief disappears, it is irrational to continue to the
pharmacy on the basis of this earlier decision. Given that it is irrational to continue
to the store, we can tentatively make a further claim: my act of going to the store is
irrational because the belief that the store is open failed to last until I got there.
It is not clear that we can justifiably move to the further claim. Perhaps, in some
sense, my act of going to the store is rational because my initial decision to go to the
store is rational, given my beliefs when I decided to go. Or, perhaps my continuing to
the store is irrational not because I lose the belief that the store is open, but because
I gain the belief that it is closed. For these reasons, the second example is not as
clear as the first example.
Still, the examples bring out an obvious but important point: acts take place
over time. More controversially, the examples suggest that the rationality of an act
is sensitive to what happens over time; in particular, rational acts require a certain
stability in belief over time. For, in the examples, a particular belief fails to last for
the duration of an act, and so, arguably, the act is irrational. In other words, the act
is irrational because a particular belief does not last until that act is finished. The
examples thus support (R) because (R) says a person's act is rational only if she has
some belief or other which lasts throughout the performance of that act:
Principle (R) A person's act is rational only if she has a belief when that act is
initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
In fact, the examples support a claim more specific than (R). They suggest that the
required belief is not just any old belief or other. The required belief is a particular
belief that is closely connected to the act in question. The required belief is apparently
a belief that supports- or even guides- the act. But two examples are not enough to
understand how to make (R) more specific.
Indeed, two examples are not enough to show that we should accept (R), let alone
a more specific version of (R). But the examples do provide some reason to accept
(R). That is enough for now. More needs to be said, and, in sections 3.6 and 3.7, I
will do so. There I will argue directly for (R), and defend it against some objections.
But first, I will use (R) in responding to skepticism. Seeing it in action will help
clarify it. Seeing it in action will also permit us to evaluate it in the context of the
anti-skeptical role that it is supposed to play.
3.4 A response to skepticism
(R) is a claim about what is required for an act to be rational. So it may be puzzling
how this claim can be used to respond to skeptical arguments that lead to conclusions
like: no one can know anything about the external world, or no one can have justified
beliefs about other minds. Skeptical conclusions concern our epistemic situation,
while (R) concerns action.
To apply (R), I will characterize skepticism in an unfamiliar way. Rather than
focusing attention on particular skeptical arguments, I will instead discuss the changes
in belief state that occur when a person is convinced by a skeptical argument. My
suggestion is that rational acts cannot span certain changes in belief state. More
precisely, there are pairs of belief states, s, and s2, such that no one, during a rational
act, can be first in sl, then in s2. Even so, it may be rational to be in either belief
state sl or S2. And it may be possible to move from sl to s2 by rational belief changes.
Yet, I claim, it is not possible to move from sl to s2 while acting rationally.
In order to develop this proposal I need to explain what changes in belief state
occur when someone becomes convinced by a skeptical argument, and why those
changes in belief state cannot occur during a rational act. For heuristic reasons, I
will begin with an extreme case. Then I will extend the proposal to more commonly
discussed cases.
3.4.1 Principle (R) applied to extreme skepticism
Next I present an illustrative example: I will argue that principle (R) helps provide a
response to an extreme form of skepticism. Consider an argument that is intended to
bring a person to give up all of his beliefs. (This may have been the point of ancient
skeptical arguments; some say that the Pyrrhonian skeptics presented arguments that
were supposed to bring their dogmatist opponents to give up all of their beliefs.) A
person who becomes convinced by such an argument enters an extreme skeptical state:
Definition 1 S is in an extreme skeptical state if and only if: for every proposi-
tion w she neither believes w, nor believes -w; and she is able to form beliefs.
The last clause excludes things like rocks and trucks, which, though lacking beliefs,
are not in an extreme skeptical state.
Now (R) supports the following anti-skeptical claim:
Anti-Skeptical Claim No one can enter an extreme skeptical state while acting
rationally.
For, suppose a person will perform some act. And suppose that she will enter an
extreme skeptical state while performing that act. Then, no belief of hers will last
until that act is finished. By (R), that act is not rational. Therefore, no one can enter
an extreme skeptical state while acting rationally.
The Anti-Skeptical Claim helps in responding to arguments that are supposed
to bring a person to give up all of his beliefs. Since studying an argument is an
act, if the studying is rational, then, by the Anti-Skeptical Claim, a person cannot
enter an extreme skeptical state while studying. No one, while rationally studying an
argument, can enter an extreme skeptical state.
Someone may hurry to object that, even if no one can enter an extreme skeptical
state while rationally studying a skeptical argument, a person might, acting rationally,
be convinced by an extreme skeptical argument. For someone might be convinced
by an extreme skeptical argument, although he is not convinced while studying it.
Gerry, we may suppose, quite rationally studies an argument, and fails to enter an
extreme skeptical state while studying. But then, three days later, she finds herself
thinking about the argument again and manages to reason herself into an extreme
skeptical state. Hasn't Gerry, while acting rationally, been convinced by an extreme
skeptical argument?
No. If, when Gerry turns her thoughts back to the argument, she is continuing
her act of studying the argument, then her act of studying is irrational. If, while
thinking about the argument, she is performing some other act- like walking to the
store- then that act is irrational. Either way she acts irrationally. And if Gerry is
not performing any act at all, then it may be that she has, quite rationally, managed
to reach an extreme skeptical state. But that is not the same as being convinced by
an extreme skeptical argument, while acting rationally.
I am suggesting that no rational act can be performed while certain belief changes
are happening. This is so, even if, considered on their own, those belief changes are
rational. More precisely, even if it is rational to move from belief state s to an extreme
skeptical state e, a transition from s to e could not occur during a rational act. Thus,
someone could perhaps reach an extreme skeptical state by rational belief changes;
however, he could not do so while performing a rational act.
I will respond to further objections in section 3.7.
The Anti-Skeptical Claim helps a rational person avoid skepticism. According to
the Anti-Skeptical Claim, no one can enter an extreme skeptical state while acting
rationally. But a rational person should not act irrationally. So a rational person
should not let himself enter an extreme skeptical state while he is performing some
act; a rational person should not let himself be convinced by an extreme skeptical
argument while he is performing some act. For example, suppose that rational Rhonda
decides to spend an evening analyzing the arguments reported by Sextus Empiricus.
Rhonda should not let herself be convinced, and so enter an extreme skeptical state.
For to do so would mean that her evening study is irrational. Thus, assuming that
we are rational, we should not let ourselves be convinced by an extreme skeptical
argument while performing some act.
I will now turn to more commonly discussed forms of skepticism.
3.4.2 The proposal extended to other forms of skepticism
Readers are probably used to thinking that to be convinced by a skeptical argument
is to accept a skeptical conclusion like: no one is justified in believing anything about
the external world; or, no one knows anything about other minds. I instead offer an
unorthodox characterization: when convinced by a skeptical argument, a person gives
up some portion of his beliefs. I will motivate this unorthodox characterization in the
next section. But first, granting this characterization, let us see if the approach will
work.
Consider a person who gives up some portion of his beliefs. Perhaps, for example,
he gives up all of his beliefs about the external world, or about the past, or about
other minds, or even about the Red Sox.
Inspired by the last section, one might try to argue that no one, while acting
rationally, can give up all of his beliefs about the external world. Or, no one, while
acting rationally, can give up all of his beliefs about the past, or other minds, or
the Red Sox. We would just need a version of (R) that says that every rational act
requires several beliefs: one about the external world, one about the past, one about
other minds, and another about the Red Sox.
This approach looks hopeless. It would be difficult to argue that no one, while
acting rationally, can give up all of his beliefs about the Red Sox. For, obviously, I
can take a rational walk to the supermarket without requiring any of my Red Sox
beliefs. Moreover, it seems clear that I can take a rational walk to the supermarket
without requiring any of my beliefs about other minds. And I can perhaps do the
same without relying on any of my beliefs about the past or about the external world.
(Maybe I could act based on beliefs about my present perceptual experiences.)
Despite this dead end, there is a tenable, interesting claim in the neighborhood.
Note that ordinarily when we act, we do rely on beliefs about the external world. In
the earlier pharmacy example, my act relied on a belief that the pharmacy was open;
my act relied on a belief about the external world. And, in acting we ordinarily do
rely on beliefs about the past (should I trust her again?) and about other minds (how
would he feel if I did that?).
If, ordinarily, our rational acts require beliefs about the external world, then,
ordinarily, a person, acting rationally, cannot give up all of his beliefs about the
external world. And if, ordinarily, our acts require beliefs about the past or other
minds, then, ordinarily, a person, acting rationally, cannot give up all of his beliefs
about the past or other minds.
Of course ordinarily is not always. This approach concedes the possibility, while
acting rationally, of giving up all beliefs about the external world, the past, or other
minds. Thus this approach is weaker than the approach in the last section, in which
it was claimed that no one, while acting rationally, could give up all of his beliefs.
Recall, however, that in the last section, I left it open that a person, while per-
forming no act, might rationally enter a state without any beliefs. Here, I widen
that opening: while performing certain rational acts, a person might give up certain
portions of his beliefs.
The size of that opening depends on the portion of beliefs being discussed. I
suspect that most of our acts rely on beliefs about the external world. However, I
doubt whether Red Sox beliefs are as central to our actions. This approach is more
effective for some classes of belief (like external world beliefs) than other classes of
beliefs (e.g. Red Sox beliefs).
This approach can handle interesting cases. Suppose you decide to spend the
evening sitting by your fireplace, carefully reading a book about skepticism. If this
is an ordinary case, where the rationality of your act depends on your having lasting
beliefs about the external world (that you are reading a book, or that you are sitting
by your fireplace), then if your act of sitting and reading is rational, you will not be
convinced by the book to give up all of your beliefs about the external world.
Note that this approach requires changes to (R). In the external world case, for
example:
Principle (R+) Ordinarily, a person's act is rational only if she has a belief about
the external world when that act is initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
When arguing for (R), I will also argue for principles like (R+).
3.4.3 Accepting a skeptical conclusion
In the foregoing response to skepticism, I described being convinced by a skeptical
argument as giving up some or all beliefs. But it is not obvious that becoming
convinced by a skeptical argument is best characterized as giving up some or all
beliefs. One would have thought that to become convinced by a skeptical argument is
to come to believe a skeptical conclusion. A person who comes to believe a skeptical
conclusion does not give up beliefs; he gains a new belief- belief in the skeptical
conclusion.
These two ways of understanding what happens when a person is convinced by
a skeptical argument not only differ, they appear incompatible. In this section, I
will draw them together. I can't consider every skeptical conclusion here, so I will
consider two representative examples: no one can have justified beliefs about the
external world, and no one can have any knowledge about the external world.
Think about Rex, a rational person with an ordinary array of beliefs about the
external world. One day, an argument in philosophy class convinces Rex that no one
can have justified beliefs about the external world. At this point, can Rex rationally
maintain his beliefs about the external world? Can Rex, rationally, believe that no
one can have any justified beliefs about the external world, at the same time as Rex
maintains beliefs about the external world? If not, then if Rex remains in a rational
belief state when he comes to believe that no one can have a justified belief about
the external world, then he gives up all of his beliefs about the external world.
Linking principles
In more general terms, the following principles link the two ways of understanding
what happens when a person is convinced by a skeptical argument:
(I) a person cannot, rationally, at the same time hold beliefs about the external
world and believe that no one can have justified beliefs about the external world.
(II) a person cannot, rationally, at the same time hold beliefs about the external
world and believe that no belief about the external world can amount to knowledge.
Given (I), for example, a person who holds some beliefs about the external world,
and who then becomes convinced that no beliefs about the external world can be
justified, must, on pain of irrationality, either give up his beliefs about the external
world, or give up his belief that no beliefs about the external world can be justified.
(I) and (II) are not outlandish. In a rational belief state, beliefs about beliefs "fit
together" with other beliefs. For instance, a person in a rational belief state does not
both have a belief and believe that that belief is irrational. So, it is reasonable to
think that there are true principles which, like (I) and (II), require that beliefs about
the epistemic status of beliefs "fit together" with other beliefs.
I will next briefly explain why (I) and (II) are defensible.
(I) is plausible
There are many ways of understanding the skeptical conclusion that no belief about
the external world can be justified, because there are many ways to understand what
the status of being justified amounts to. On some of these ways, (I) is plausible. Here
are two examples.
A. According to one view, a belief is justified just in case it is permissible to hold
that belief. So suppose the skeptical conclusion is that it is never permissible to hold
a belief about the external world. A person who accepts this conclusion is a short step
from having some belief B, while believing that it is not permissible to have belief B.
That seems unreasonable- to believe that you have a belief that you shouldn't have.4
B. According to another view, your belief that p is justified just in case a belief that
p better fits your evidence than a belief that -_p.s So suppose the skeptical conclusion
is that, ior any proposition p about the external world, no belief that p can ever fit
a person's evidence better or worse than a belief that -'p. A person who accepts
this conclusion (and who has external world beliefs) is a short step from having a
belief that p, while believing that her belief that p can never fit her evidence any
better or worse than a belief that -np. This, arguably, is irrational even if that person
believes that her belief that p is morally or prudentially justified. For, arguably, you
should not believe that p while believing that you hold that belief solely for moral or
prudential reasons.6
(II) may be plausible
On some ways of thinking about knowledge, (II) is plausible too. On others, (II) is
rather implausible.' Here is one example of each.
A. Suppose that the skeptic argues that no belief can amount to knowledge because
no belief can be certain, and knowledge requires certainty. It seems unlikely that
coming to believe that no belief about the external world can be certain requires you
to give up your beliefs about the external world. For it does not seem unreasonable
to believe that p, although you are not certain whether p, and you believe that you
can never be certain whether p. For instance, it seems reasonable to believe that no
brontosaurus was kelly green even though, given the limited evidence, you believe you
will never be certain about that.
4While this view of justification supports (I), this view may render my anti-skeptical approach
unnecessary. If a person who ought to believe p, can believe p, then, on this view, if you can't help
believing p, then that belief is justified. If so, then if I cannot give up some belief about the external
world, then that belief is justified. However, it is very unclear whether a rational person who ought
to believe p can believe p. So this view of justification is, I think, worth mentioning. (R. Stalnaker
offered this comment to me.)
SSee [25]. Note that Conee and Feldman discuss justified attitudes (like believing or suspending
judgment) rather than justified beliefs. For simplicity I ignore this important distinction.
6 Adler[l] argues for a thesis similar to (I): it is impossible to believe that p, while, in full awareness,
believing that you lack adequate evidence that p.
7 1t does not matter if (II) is false. If the argument of Chapter 4 is correct, then even if (II) is
false, skepticism about knowledge of the external world is harmless.
B. According to one view, if a person believes that p, then even if she does not
know that p, she reasons as if she knows that p.8 If you falsely believe that you left
the headlights on, although you do not know that you left the headlights on, you will
reason as if you do and decide to go back to turn them off. Now suppose you come to
believe that no belief about the external world can amount to knowledge. Arguably,
it is unreasonable to believe that your belief that p cannot amount to knowledge, and
then reason as if you know that p. That would be like treating the naked emperor as
if he is wearing clothes.
A conditional claim
Discussing principles like (I) and (II) is a way to discuss a broader issue: how serious
or threatening to our world view would it be to accept a skeptical conclusion? Would
it hold only theoretical interest? Or would it turn our view upside down?
Perhaps, in accepting a skeptical conclusion, we merely learn something theoret-
ically curious about our epistemic situation. We thought that some of our beliefs
were justified, or that we had knowledge, but that was mistaken. Beyond revising a
few rarefied theoretical beliefs, we may, rationally, go on believing what we believed
before.
Or, perhaps accepting the conclusion would be deeply affecting. Perhaps accepting
a skeptical conclusion rationally requires us to revise ordinary, non-theoretical beliefs.
If so, accepting the skeptical conclusion would deeply affect how we conceive the world.
Absent a full defense of principles like (I) and (II), I can at least make a conditional
claim about the anti-skeptical approach I am proposing.
If there are true principles like (I) and (II), then accepting some skeptical con-
clusions would be deeply affecting. If there are true principles like (I) and (II), then
accepting some skeptical conclusions would rationally require us to give up some or
all of our ordinary, non-theoretical beliefs. If there are true principles like (I) and
(II), then my unorthodox characterization (of becoming convinced by a skeptical ar-
gument as giving up of some or all beliefs) is apposite, and my anti-skeptical approach
8 Williamson[71, pp 46-8] suggests that "believing p is, roughly, treating p as if one knew p."
is appropriate.
If, on the other hand, there are no true principles like (I) and (II), then accepting
a skeptical conclusion would only affect beliefs about beliefs. If accepting a skeptical
conclusion would only affect beliefs about beliefs, then my anti-skeptical approach
is probably not relevant. (It is not relevant unless accepting a skeptical conclusion
involves giving up some beliefs about beliefs needed for rational action.) But if
accepting a skeptical conclusion would only affect beliefs about beliefs, then one
might wonder whether skepticism deserves a response. If only beliefs about beliefs
are affected, then, I am tempted to say, skepticism does not seem so threatening after
all.
More needs to be said. For present purposes, I only claim this: the plausibility of
some interpretations of principles (I) and (II) justifies interest in the present proposal.
3.5 Misinterpretations of the proposal
Next I clarify the present anti-skeptical proposal by comparing it to other approaches.
3.5.1 Skepticism is bad for you?
You probably have not yet heard the funniest joke in the world. That's the one that's
so funny that anyone who hears and understands it will quickly laugh himself to
death. If you hope to stay alive, you ought remain far from the funniest joke in the
world. If you hope to stay alive, it would be irrational to listen to the funniest joke in
the world.9 Someone might think that the present proposal is similar. Someone might
think that the present proposal is this: a skeptical state is bad for you, therefore it is
irrational to enter a skeptical state.
This is not the present proposal. Even if a skeptical state is good for you, ac-
cording to the present proposal, no one, ordinarily, while acting rationally, can enter
a skeptical state. This is so because rational acts require beliefs that last. The pro-
posal does not rest on any claim that a skeptical state is bad for you, or irrational,
9 An episode of Monty Python's Flying Circus showed me the dangers of this joke.
or otherwise undesirable.
It may be instructive to recall that the "goal" of the Pyrrhonian skeptic is ataraxia-
"tranquility" or "freedom from disturbance". The Pyrrhonian leads his dogmatist
rivals to ataraxia in the following way. First, the Pyrrhonian uses the dogmatist's
own beliefs and methods to bring the dogmatist to suspend judgment on some (or
all) propositions. After that, ataraxia follows, as if by serendipity. In Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus tells the following story to display the transition to a
state of ataraxia.[PH I 28] The painter Apelles is trying to paint the foam on a horse's
mouth. After many unsuccessful attempts he gives up in frustration and throws his
sponge at the canvas, producing the effect perfectly. The moral is unclear, but we
might see this story as suggesting that ataraxia is not something one reaches by trying
to get there. When it comes, it comes as if by accident.
It may be a stretch, but I think Sextus Empiricus' tale displays an insight con-
nected to the present proposal: setting a goal to achieve ataraxia will not get one
there. One could get there by accident or mistake, but no one can get there by de-
sign. In present terms, we might explain this as follows: no belief can survive a trip
to ataraxia; so, no rational act will suffice to achieve ataraxia.'0
3.5.2 A skeptic can't live a life?
In ancient times, critics of Pyrrhonian skepticism complained that no one can live a
life as a skeptic. It is impossible to live a life without belief, the critics said.[16] In the
present framework, this suggestion is that no one without beliefs can act rationally.
This suggestion is related to (and part of the inspiration) of the proposal I am making,
but it is not the same proposal. In its extreme form, my proposal is that, a complete
loss of belief cannot occur during a rational act; a transition from a state with beliefs
to a state without beliefs cannot occur during a rational act. This is not the same
as saying that a person without beliefs cannot perform a rational act. The point of
loG. Striker [62] helpfully discusses the complicated role of ataraxia in Pyrrhonian skepticism. She
thinks that the Pyrrhonian reasoning does not require- and would be better off without- talk of
ataraxia.
my proposal is to try to show that a person with beliefs, who always acts rationally,
and who is always performing some act or other, will never reach a skeptical state.
Whether or not a person without beliefs can act rationally- or can even act at all-
is a different question.
3.5.3 Reasoning your way to skepticism
Someone might understand the proposal this way: no one can rationally accept skep-
ticism about the external world because the act of reasoning your way to skepticism
about the external world is irrational. This is an interesting claim that I wish I could
make. However, it is not the proposal I am making. It just does not seem plausible
that acts of reasoning always require beliefs about the external world. So it is not
plausible that focusing on acts of reasoning will help answer skepticism about the
external world. It is plausible that the acts we perform every day (cooking dinner,
reading a book and so forth) require beliefs about the external world. That is why
I am claiming that no one, while rationally performing such ordinary acts, can be
convinced about skepticism about the external world.
3.6 Arguing for (R)
So far, we have seen a response to extreme skepticism based on principle (R):
Principle (R) A person's act is rational only if she has a belief when that act is
initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
We have also seen that variations of (R) help with other more interesting forms of
skepticism. Here is an example of such an (R) variation:
Principle (R+) Ordinarily, a person's act is rational only if she has a belief about
.Jhe external world when that act is initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
In this section I will defend (R) and (R+). I will not discuss other variations of
(R); I will assume that (R+) is a representative example.
It should be emphasized that while (R) gives a necessary condition for any act
to be rational, (R+) does not. By (R), every rational act requires a lasting belief.
As far as (R+) goes, some rational act may fail to require a lasting belief about the
external world.
I will defend (R) by reflection about the nature of action. In arguing that every
rational act requires some lasting belief, I will also argue that the acts that we ordi-
narily perform require lasting beliefs about the external world. If so, then (R+) is
correct.
3.6.1 A failed argument
There is a tempting but flawed way to defend (R). Plausibly, a person cannot ratio-
nally change all of her beliefs at once. That is, a rational revision from belief state s
to belief state s', requires that at least one belief be preserved from s to s'. If, further,
an act is rational only if the belief revisions which occur during that act are rational
belief revisions, then we have the makings of a defense of (R).
This defense of (R) is based on two premises: (1) if S's act is rational then every
belief revision of S's which occurs during that act is rational; (2) if a revision from
belief state s to belief state s' is rational, then at least one belief is preserved from s
to s'.
This defense of (R) faces the following counterexample. While performing a ra-
tional act, a person makes a series of rational belief revisions, where each revision
preserves at least one belief, but the first state in the series, si, and the last state, sn,
share no belief in common.
If the transition from si to sn counts as a rational belief revision, then premise (2)
is false. If the transition from si to so is a belief revision, but not a rational one, then
premise (1) is false. If the transition from si to Sn is not a belief revision (although
each intermediate step is) then the example conflicts with (R) because no belief lasts
through the rational act.
Beyond this counterexample, the prospects for an argument for (R) based on (1)
and (2) are further diminished by noting that premise (1) appears false. Surely a
person may make irrational belief revisions that are unrelated to a rational act they
are performing. He may rationally walk to the supermarket, while, at the same time,
thinking bizarre thoughts about poetry. A person can apparently change belief state
irrationally while acting rationally. Thus, it looks hopeless to defend (R) on the basis
of (1) and (2).
But perhaps we do not need (R) after all. Premise (2) could ground an anti-
skeptical strategy. (2) alone suffices to conclude that no one with beliefs can, by
rational belief revisions, reach a state without beliefs. So (2) alone may help with
extreme skepticism. And, perhaps, something could be added to help with other forms
of skepticism. Perhaps not all beliefs about the external world can rationally be given
up because beliefs about the external world are required for rational belief revision to
occur. (This is reminiscent of Strawson's suggestion that some commitments underly
our "rational competence".) If so, then we don't need (R+) either. For, in that case,
no one could rationally give up all of his beliefs about the external world.
I am doubtful of the suggestion that external world beliefs are required for rational
belief revision. I also doubt whether a non-question begging defense of premise (2)
can be given. Still, perhaps an anti-skeptical strategy could be mustered, based solely
on considerations about belief revision. But I will not attempt that here. I turn now
to a different argument for (R).
3.6.2 A better argument
(R) says that a lasting belief is required by every rational act. So, to defend (R), an
investigation of rational acts is in order.
Rational acts
Performing a rational act, as I conceive it, requires the following two steps.
1. Adopting an appropriate plan. 2. Carrying out that plan.
These two steps are, I claim, necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, to perform a
rational act.
Let me fill out this picture a little more.
- A plan specifies how an act will be performed. When adopted, the plan may be
incompletely specified, details filled in as the act progresses.
- If a person adopts an appropriate plan, then he adopts a plan in accord with his
values, preferences and beliefs.
- When a person acts rationally, the plan plays a guiding role. Think of this role in
one of two ways: the plan itself helps to guide the act; or the person acts by following
that plan.
- A rational actor follows a plan, but is not slavishly bound to her plan. Sometimes,
a rational act is terminated before the plan is carried out to completion.
This is the outline of a framework. Still, enough is on the table to see that the
framework is simple and interesting. It is interesting for at least three reasons.
1. The framework encompasses many of the acts in our daily life. We do choose
and follow plans for acts: distant and sketchy plans (get a PhD) or immediate and
more detailed (cook a tiramisu). And we see this way of acting as reasonable.
2. Adopting an appropriate plan, and following that plan are only claimed to be
necessary for an act to be rational. This is compatible with varying ways of spelling
out necessary and sufficient condition for an act to be rational.
3. This conception of a rational act is consonant with contemporary work in the
theory of action.'1 '12
An argument for (R)
One way to defend (R) would be to fully specify this conception of a rational act, and
incorporate it within a plausible theory of action. In the end, I think that is what
"
1 Action theorists (who agree on little) widely agree that something (a 'plan' or an 'intention')
plays a role in guiding action. Here are some examples. Myles Brand claims: "the cognitive com-
ponent of an immediate intention is the guidance and monitoring of ongoing activity." [13, p 173]
According to Alfred Mele, "An intention to A incorporates a plan for A-ing ... and one who success-
fully executes this intention is guided by the plan." [48, p 144] Michael Bratman argues that human
agents are planning agents: "we settle in advance on [partial, future-directed] plans of action, fill
them in, adjust them, and follow through with them as time goes by."[15, p 1][141. J. David Velle-
man speaks of the "direction of guidance" of an intention: an intention causes what it represents.[67,
p 25] (Note that these philosophers are discussing intentional action, rather than rational action.
However, I believe they would accept that all rational actions are intentional actions.)
12 Dion Scott-Kakures[59] relies on the claim that intentional actions are guided and monitored in
arguing that believing at will is impossible. According to Scott-Kakures, "the reason that I cannot
succeed in directly willing to believe that p is that the process which results in the generation of the
belief would have to be unmonitored or ungoverned by the content of the intention or the plan...
No one can will a belief that p because ... nothing could count as initiating a guided and monitored
process which succeeded in producing a belief." [59, p 92] Although Scott-Kakures's argument fails
(as ably shown by Dana Radcliffe[55]), I found his attempt instructive. (Thanks to R. Feldman for
pointing me toward Scott-Kakures's essay.)
would be necessary to defend (R) in a satisfying way. I will not be able to accomplish
that in the confines of an essay. Still, I will outline an argument in favor of (R).
I have just urged that rational acts are planned acts:
Premise 1. A rational act is guided by an appropriate plan.
Note, that for present purposes we may remain vague about what it is to be guided
by a plan, as long as, in order to play its guiding role, the plan has been adopted when
the act begins, and the plan continues to be accepted throughout the performance of
the act. I believe that this much is uncontroversial, although some philosophers may
prefer to speak of intentions rather than plans.
What needs to be spelled out further, and what may bring some controversy, is
what is required to be guided by an appropriate plan: what is required to adopt
an appropriate plan, and once adopted, what is required to continue to accept an
appropriate plan. Here is where I propose to bring in belief.
Premise 2. When a person adopts an appropriate plan, he relies on some beliefs.
This premise says that a person relies on beliefs in adopting an appropriate plan. Call
these beliefs the adoption beliefs. One more premise is needed to reach (R).
Premise 3. While continuing to accept an appropriate plan, a person maintains at
least one of the adoption beliefs of that plan.
(R) follows from Premise 1, 2 and 3. Premise 1 ensures that a plan is accepted
throughout the performance of a rational act. Premise 2 guarantees that there be
some adoption beliefs, and Premise 3 requires that at least one of those adoption
beliefs last while the plan is accepted. It follows that some belief will last throughout
each rational act.'3
Premise 1 is plausible, if the conception I have given of a rational act is plausible.
Premise 2 and 3, however, need support.
'
3 Some theories of action provide a shorter route to (R). According to some theories of action,
intending involves having a certain belief. According to Harman, S intends to A only if S believes
that he will A.[31, pp 90-931 According to Velleman, an intention is a kind of belief.[66][67] Other
philosophers think that an intention is simply a belief-desire pair. If having an intention involves
having a certain belief, and a rational act requires a guiding intention, then a belief lasts through
the performance of each rational act.
Premise 2 is plausible
Try to imagine a counterexample to Premise 2. Consider Emma, who adopts a plan
P without relying on any beliefs, and then acts rationally by following plan P. She
does not rely on a belief that plan P is better than other plans. She does not rely on
a belief that following plan P is morally required. She does not rely on a belief that
she will carry out plan P. She does not rely on a belief that carrying out plan P is
likely to achieve her goals. She does not rely on a belief about the world, about the
past or about herself. Not only that, she does not rely on any belief in formulating
the content of plan P. If plan P is to eat a sandwich, she does not use any beliefs
about sandwiches, or eating, or how sandwiches are eaten in order to formulate the
plan.
When I try to imagine a counterexample to Premise 2, I fail. The best I can do
is this: Emma chooses plan P because she values following plan P more highly than
following any other plan. Even so, I cannot imagine that it would be rational for
Emma to follow that plan without relying on a belief that following plan P is highly
valuable.
A failure to imagine a counterexample is not conclusive evidence. But it does
make Premise 2 look plausible.' 4
Premise 3 is plausible
When should we reconsider our plans?
Clearly, we need not reconsider our plans whenever our beliefs change. Otherwise
we would be spending most of our time reconsidering plans, and little time following
them. A plan, to some degree, should stick.
On the other hand, we should not be "plan worshippers". 15 Clearly, we should
4"Within the framework of Bayesian decision theory, Premise 2 is not obviously correct. In this
framework, a belief state of suspending judgment on all propositions is represented by a probability
function that serves in expected utility calculations as well as any other belief state. So, in this
framework, a person apparently needs no beliefs to choose a rational act (an act that maximizes
expected utility). However, it is not clear to me that the probability model can adequately represent
suspension of judgment. Still, a decision theoretic veision of the present response to skepticism
would be desirable; it is just not clear how to formulate it.
"'Michael Bratman[15] coins the expression "plan worship" in raising very similar issues.
sometimes reconsider our plans when our beliefs change. If I come to believe that it
is not only silly, but dangerous to keep climbing the mountain, I should think about
giving that plan up.
When should we reconsider our plans? Here is a partial suggestion. Suppose
a person relies on some beliefs in adopting a plan. Then she begins to follow the
plan. If, before she completes her act, she gives up all of those beliefs, then she
should reconsider her plan. In short, a plan becomes suspect if all beliefs relied on in
adopting that plan are lost.
This suggestion is a minimal condition; maybe a plan should be reconsidered for
other reasons too. But this minimal condition is enough tG support Premise 3, if to
reconsider a plan is to stop following that plan, and then decide whether or not to
continue following that plan.
Thinking about Premise 3 raises difficult questions. Can a rational person continue
to follow a plan while reconsidering it? When is it rationally required or permitted
to reconsider a plan? When is it rationally permissible to adhere to a plan? Can a
rational person make a binding commitment to a plan, come what may?
Answers to at least some of these questions are needed to fully defend Premise 3.
3.6.3 What about (R+)?
(R+) can be defended by modifying the above argument.
Principle (R+) Ordinarily, a person's act is rational only if she has a belief about
the external world when that act is initiated which lasts until that act is finished.
Premise 1. A rational act is guided by an appropriate plan.
Premise 2A. Ordinarily, when a person adopts an appropriate plan, he relies on some
beliefs about the external world.
This premise says that, ordinarily, a person relies on beliefs about the external world
in adopting an appropriate plan. Call these beliefs the external world adoption beliefs.
One more premise is needed to reach (R+).
Premise 3A. While continuing to accept an appropriate plan (that hcs some external
world adoption beliefs), a person maintains at least one of the external world adoption
beliefs.
Now I think that, like Premise 2, Premise 2A is appealing. It does seem that we
rely on beliefs about the external world in adopting plans for many (or most) of our
everyday acts. However, Premise 3A is not obviously true.
We might try to support Premise 3A with Premise 3. Unfortunately, Premise 3 is
too weak. It follows from Premise 3 that, while continuing to accept an appropriate
plan (that has some external world adoption beliefs), a person maintains at least one
of the adoption beliefs of that plan. But, unless every adoption belief is an external
world adoption belief, the belief maintained need not be an external world adoption
belief. Some other kind of belief could be maintained.
Premise 3A follows from:
Premise 3B While continuing to accept an appropriate plan, a person maintains every
adoption belief of that plan.
However, Premise 3B is too strong to be plausible. Why can't a person reasonably
give up even one adoption belief?
Is there a defensible claim stronger than Premise 3, but weaker than Premise
3B? Perhaps, with better understanding of rational acts, we will find that some,
but not all adoption beliefs are central, and that the central adoption beliefs are
maintained. If, in addition, ordinarily, some central adoption beliefs are beliefs about
the external world, then we will have an argument for (R+). As yet, I cannot defend
this suggestion.
3.7 Objections to the anti-skeptical proposal
3.7.1 Objection 1
If Gromit acts rationally, then Twin-Gromit, Gromit's internal duplicate, acts ratio-
nally too. But, according to (R) and (R+), Gromit may act rationally while Twin-
Gromit acts irrationally. For Gronlit and Twin-Gromit are in different environments.
They might receive contrary news reports tomorrow; Gromit's beliefs may last longer
than Twin-Gromit's corresponding beliefs.
Suppose that Gromit has a belief that will last longer than Twin-Gromit's cor-
responding belief. Therefore, although Gromit and Twin-Gromit are now internal
duplicates, they will not be internal duplicates later. Let us also suppose that Gromit
now initiates act A, while Twin-Gromit initiates a corresponding act A'. According
to the objector, if A is rational, then A' is rational too. The objector is correct if the
rationality of an act is fully determined by the internal state of an agent when they
initiate the act.
Such a view faces the following counterexample. Aaron is a sailor about to tack.
Aaron's present internal state determines that his tacking will be rational. Bart is a
sailor about to tack. Bart's internal state is just like Aaron's except that Bart has
a disposition to behave rather oddly whenever he sees a dolphin. But not only is it
extremely unlikely that Bart will see a dolphin, Bart will not see a dolphin. How
can this odd disposition be relevant to the rationality of Bart's tacking? If Aaron's
tacking is rational, then Bart's tacking is rational too. Curt is a sailor about to tack.
Curt's internal state is just like Bart's. So, on the objector's view, if Bart's tacking
is rational, then Curt's tacking is rational too. The unlikely occurs: Curt sees a
dolphin, tacks the wrong way, and causes the boat to capsize. Curt's behavior seems
irrational.
The objector can perhaps defend his view. But, I think I have said enough to
show that this objection should not be accepted without much more argument.
3.7.2 Objection 2
Whether or not an act is rational depends only on what is available to the person
when he decides to so act. But, according to (R) and (R+), an act may be irrational
because of something that is not available to the person when he decides to act.
As in Objection 1, this objector suggests that the rationality of an act is al-
ready determined just as an act is initiated. However, Objection 2 contains a further
thought. Stated vaguely, the thought is that rational acts are seen by the agent, from
his own point of view, as rational. The point of view of some outside observer is
irrelevant. But (R) and (R+) do not fit this picture. What will happen in the future
is outside an agent's point of view, and (R) and (R+) have it that what will happen
in the future matters to the rationality of an act that a person is about the perform.
For, according to (R) and (R+), the length of time a belief will last matters to the
rationality of an act that a person is about to perform.
In response: Surely it needs to be spelled out what it is for an act to be seen as
rational from an agent's own point of view. But even without more detail, we can
see that (R) and (R+) are not incompatible with that vague thought. The agent has
a point of view at each moment during an act. (R) and (R+) say that rational acts
require beliefs that last long enough. The loss of a belief is presumably available to
the agent, from his own point of view. So, while performing an act, any failure to
meet the condit;ons set by (R) and (R+) is presumably available to him, from his
own point of view.
3.7.3 Objection 3
For all the argument shows, the lasting beliefs required for each rational act may be
given up just as the act finishes. So, all of these beliefs may be lost at the moment
a rational act finishes; at the moment a rational act finishes, a person can enter a
skeptical state. Thus, while acting rationally, a person can enter a skeptical state.
The objector raises a difficult question about timing. Let us agree that if an act
continues after its last adoption belief is lost, then, by the argument for (R), that act
is irrational. Let us also agree that if an act finishes before its last adoption belief
is lost, then, as far as the argument goes, that act may be rational. But what if
an act finishes at the very moment its last adoption belief is lost? According to the
objector, as far as the argument goes, that act may be rational, so a person may enter
a skeptical state while acting rationally.
Consider the skeptical state of having given up all external world beliefs. Even if
the objector is correct, to enter that skeptical state while acting rationally, a person
must rationally finish all of her ongoing acts which require external world beliefs at
the moment she loses her last adoption belief. Otherwise, she performs at least one
irrational act. This situation is odd. Ordinarily we are performing many different
acts which require external world beliefs. It would be odd to rationally finish all of
these ongoing acts at just the same moment. As far as I can tell, it would cause
no harm to allow that, in this odd crase, a person, while acting rationally, may enter
that skeptical state. However, this objection reveals that the present response to
skepticism holds more interest, if, in ordinary life, people indeed are often engaged in
multiple acts requiring external world beliefs.
3.7.4 Objection 4
According to the anti-skeptical proposal, some skeptical argument is flawless. But if
you believe that some skeptical argument is flawless, you should accept the conclusion;
if you believe that some skeptical argument is flawless, you should become a skeptic.
Thus, even if (R) and (R+) are correct, the proposal does not help with skepticism.
The anti-skeptical proposal is that, ordinarily, no one, while acting rationally, can
be convinced by a skeptical argument. At the beginning of this essay, I said that I
would propose an approach to skepticism distinct either from accepting skepticism
(in some form or other), or facing the problem of satisfactorily locating defects in
every skeptical argument.
Note, however, that the anti-skeptical proposal is compatible with the claim that
no skeptical argument is flawless. I do not advocate such an approach to skepticism
because I doubt whether it is any more powerful than simply accepting the problem
of satisfactorily explaining what is wrong with every skeptical argument.
The anti-skeptical proposal is also compatible with the claim that there is a flawless
skeptical argument. I think this approach to skepticism is more interesting. The
objection is that this approach falls into skepticism.
This objection is mistaken. Believing that there is a flawless skeptical argument
is compatible with failing to believe, of any particular skeptical argument, that it is
flawless. But the latter is what is needed for the objection. The objection is appar-
ently based on a principle like this: if you believe that argument A is flawless, then
you should accept the conclusion of argument A. This principle does not apply when
you merely believe that there is a flawless skeptical argument out there. (If every
skeptical argument has the same conclusion, and you believe that there is a flaw-
less skeptical argument out there, then, perhaps, you should accept the conclusion.
However, not every skeptical argument has the same conclusion.) 16 ,17
3.8 Conclusions
To recap: I first argued that no one, while acting rationally, can be convinced by
an extreme skeptical argument. I then argued that, ordinarily, no one, while acting
rationally, can be convinced by other skeptical arguments. I have three speculative
conclusions to offer.
1. Many philosophers think it reasonable to ignore skepticism. In a sense, they
are right. If paying attention to a skeptical argument puts one at risk of acting
irrationally, then the risk is avoided by staying away from skeptical arguments.
2. The results of this essay can give comfort to those who have felt the disquieting
temptation of skeptical arguments. One may acknowledge the temptation to be con-
vinced by accepting that some skeptical arguments are flawless. Yet, there is reason to
resist the temptation to be convinced by a skeptical argument: avoiding an irrational
act.
3. It is a weak objection to a theory that it "leads to skepticism". That an apparently
valid skeptical argument can be constructed from premises taken from a theory is not
sufficient to show that the theory is mistaken. For, if this essay is correct, a non-
skeptic may accept that there is a flawless skeptical argument. So, a non-skeptic
may accept that there is a flawless skeptical argument constructed from premises
taken from a theory he accepts. However, a non-skeptic may not accept, of some
particular skeptical argument, that it is flawless. For (as suggested in Objection 4) if
a person believes of an argument that it is flawless, he should accept the conclusion.
16 N. M. L. Nathan[49] is one non-skeptic who explicitly claims that some skeptical arguments are
sound.
I'Here, briefly, are two further objections. 1. Objection: The following can be rational: you decide
to forget about the world by drinking a bottle of whiskey. When drunk, you lose all your beliefs
about the external world. Then you get them back when you sober up. So, beliefs don't need to
last through a rational act. Reply: Maybe so. But if so, (R) and (R+) can be weakened to require
only that the belief be present at the beginning and the end of the act, without requiring that it
persist through the act. Even weakened, (R) and (R+) are enough for an anti-skeptical strategy. 2.
Objection: (R) is false because states other than believing (like hoping or accepting) are sufficient for
rational action. Reply: Hopes by themselves are not sufficient; beliefs, arguably, are also needed. As
for accepting, I have not yet seen a theory that successfully distinguishes accepting from believing.
So, if a non-skeptic comes face to face with an apparently flawless skeptical argument
constructed from his theory, he must, on pain of irrationality in action or belief, reject
his theory, or find some flaw in the argument. If the non-skeptic stays away from
skeptical arguments, he can avoid the need to look for flaws in a skeptical argument
constructed from his theory.
3.9 More questions than answers
This chapter has many inadequacies, raising many questions. Without satisfactory
answers, I can at least pose queotions for future work.
3.9.1 Action and belief
The anti-skeptical proposal is sensitive to details about the way belief is connected
to action.
When, exactly, can a belief that supports and guides a rational act be lost?
This is a question about timing. The proposal requires a belief's presence both at
the beginning and at the conclusion of the act. If the belief can be lost just before the
act is completed, then the proposal fails. If not, but the belief can be lost just as the
act is completed, then the proposal is weakened, as noted in the reply to Objection
3. If the belief can only be lost after the act is completed then the proposal may
succeed. When, exactly, can a belief that supports and guides a rational act be lost?
The tools I use in this chapter are too blunt to tell us.
There are other questions about the way belief is connected to rational action.
What kinds of beliefs are needed in acting rationally? Beliefs about the external world?
Beliefs about the future? Beliefs about yourself?
Can beliefs at first needed in acting rationally be replaced during the act? Can every
belief needed when the act is initiated be replaced by the time the act is completed?
Can every external world belief needed when the act is initiated be replaced by the time
the act is completed?
When should a rational act be reconsidered? When should a rational act be continued
even though your belief state changes?
Again, the tools of this chapter are too blunt to answer these questions. But answers
to these questions matter for the success of the anti-skeptical proposal.
Is belief indeed needed to support and guide rational action? Or can some non-belief
state- like acceptance- do the job?
Although in this chapter I claim that belief is needed, I don't think this claim is
adequately supported. Note, however, that if some non-belief state can do the job, the
proposal in this essay may extend. If it is possible to epistemically evaluate the non-
belief state (such that there are skeptical arguments that it is not rational to be in that
state) then there is a version of the proposal relying on a claim that one of those non-
beliefs states must last through a rational act. But if it is not possible to epistemically
evaluate the non-belief state, then arguably, for that very reason, rational action is
not supported by states of that kind alone. Making progress involves: (1) stating
precisely what the non-belief state is supposed to be; (2) examining how that state
may be subjected to skeptical reasoning; (3) examining how and whether that state
can support action.
The above questions, which explore the connection between belief and action, are
interesting apart from any proposal about skepticism. I believe that tackling such
questions would be a fruitful way to approach broader questions like: What is a
belief? What is an act? When is an act rational?
3.9.2 A formal invitation
Perhaps some of the foregoing questions about the connection between belief and
rational action can be settled by adopting a formal framework. The one framework I
know of connecting belief to rational action appears insufficient, on its own, to offer
answers. According to decision theory, the rational act to choose is the one that
maximizes expected utility. One question about this framework, which I mentioned
earlier, is whether it adequately represents suspension of judgment. More relevant to
the questions I have just asked, an act, in this theory, is a single unit to be chosen
or not. As I have been discussing, seeing acts as they take place over time gives
rise to questions like: When should an act be reconsidered? When should an act lhe
continued even though your belief state changes? I suppose the decision uheorist would
say that you should reconsider when reconsidering has a higher expected utility then
not reconsidering, and you should continue when continuing has a higher expected
utility then any other possibility. But there are cases which render this suggestion
puzzling. This suggestion can leave you ineffectually oscillating between two acts
(you rationally choose act A; while performing act A your belief state unexpectedly
changes so that it is better to reconsider and switch to act B; while performing act
B your belief state unexpectedly changes so that it is better to reconsider and switch
to act A.) Surely there should be no puzzle here: you just make a relatively firm
commitment to the acts you choose. Perhaps the decision theoretic framework can
do better, if a notion of commitment can be incorporated.
3.9.3 Is this a response to skepticism?
Suppose, for the moment, that my claims about rational action are correct, in par-
ticular that (R) and (R+) are correct. Even so,
Can claims about action ground an adequate response to skepticism?
Think about the poor philosopher who gets himself tangled up in skeptical doubts.
He started reading Sextus, and now finds himself almost- but not quite-- convinced
that he has no better reason to believe any proposition about the external world
than its negation. But he can see nothing wrong with the argument leading to this
conclusion. What is the poor philosopher to think?
Even in its strongest form, the proposal I am offering looks rather unhelpful to the
poor philosopher: He is told that he will act irrationally, if he becomes convinced, and
remains in a rational belief state. Imagine his reply: "I'm doomed to irrationality!
I can't just rui away. I can't leave this skeptical argument unanswered. I have an
intellectual obligation to seek out truth and avoid falsehood. I either have to find a
flaw in the argument or accept its conclusion. But I can see no flaw, so I must accept
its conclusion, thereby (if you are right) acting irrationally."
Surely we could help the poor philosopher if we could give him an argument
that his beliefs are justified. But event the usual project of finding flaws in skeptical
arguments would be helpful, if we could find a flaw in the argument he is worried
about. Maybe even a Moorean thought could help: that he is more confident of his
beliefs about the external world than the premises of some nasty old philosophical
argument. How can the proposal I offer help?
Think from the third person point of view about the poor philosopher. If the pro-
posal I offer is correct, then, convinced by the argument, he will either act irrationally
or end up in an irrational belief state. Does that mean he is doomed to irrationality?
Not if he has other options. And he very likely does. Perhaps he might have dinner,
watch a reality show on television, and thenr. go to bed. The next morning, he might
get up and start working on philosophy of language. He can very likely do all this
acting rationally and remaining in a rational belief state. If not, there is probably
something else he can do, acting rationally, and remaining in a rational belief state.
Being rational, the poor philosopher should act rationally. So he should choose an
option like this. And he can take the third person point of view and think similar
thoughts about himself. He can think to himself "I do have another option. I can do
something else and remain rational. So I am not doomed to irrationality after all."
But what about the poor philosopher's intellectual obligation to seek the truth?
As a philosopher interested in epistemology, he wants to find out whether his exter-
nal world beliefs are justified. Perhaps a non-philosopher could just as well watch
television. But shouldn't the philosopher pay close attention to a serious argument
that could help him find what he is seeking? He shouldn't just walk away, should he?
He should. According to the proposal, the rational thing to do is to walk away.
The point here (and this should be developed further than I can at present) is that,
in a particular way, what it is rational to do takes precedence over what it is rational
to believe. The background thought is that activities of truth seeking and falsehood
avoiding have their place, and have their point, within a human life. This is very
vague. But, to be clear, I am not saying that you should come to believe something
for practical reasons, despite the evidence. I am not saying that you should come to
believe something just because it is useful. I am not saying that you should, despite
strong contrary evidence, come to believe that you can jump the crevasse because
this will give you a better chance to make it across.[36] Instead, I am saying that,
sometimes, when believing something, practical reasons demand that you not give
up that belief; sometimes practical reasons demand that you avoid or ignore counter
evidence. When believing that your beliefs about the external world are justified,
practical reasons may demand that you not give up that belief; practical reasons may
demand that you avoid or ignore evidence to the contrary.
This may sound like a plea for intransigence. It is, but only in a limited way. A
vexing question, which I cannot answer, is
When is such "intransigence" rational and when is it not?
For, on the one hand, surely we should not change our belief state in response to
every bit of information that appears. We have good practical reasons not to. We
wouldn't be doing much else; we are constantly bombarded by information.
On the other hand, surely we should not be as intransigent as Woodrow Wilson,
of whom an admiring(!) friend said: "Whenever a question is presented he keeps an
absolutely open mind and welcomes all suggestions and advice which will lead to a
correct decision. But he is receptive only during the period that he is weighing the
question and preparing to make his decision. Once the decision is made it is final and
there is an absolute end to all advice and suggestion. There is no moving him after
that."[45, p 5]
One final question:
How is the present proposal related to the anti-skepticism of Hume and Strawson?
At the beginning of this chapter, I said that the Humean response to skepticism is
based on a claim that there are some beliefs which we, by nature, cannot give up. The
problem is that we want to know why it is reasonable to hold on to these beliefs. Just
because we cannot give up a belief looks like a weak reason to set aside an argument
to the contrary. Strawson's proposal is similar, although he brings in Wittgensteinian
complexity: skepticism is idle because some commitments can neither be given up
nor intelligibly questioned.
In a nutshell, the present proposal is that holding on to some beliefs is reasonable
not for theoretical reasons, but practical reasons. Although I depart from the sug-
gestion that we cannot give up some beliefs, I think the idea is similar in spirit: we
cannot give up some beliefs while acting rationally. Moreover, like Hume and Straw-
son, I do not try answer skeptical arguments by looking for flaws, or directly arguing
that the skeptical conclusion is false. Instead, I have tried to show that skepticism
can be rationally avoided.
Chapter 4
The value of knowledge
Abstract
I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising
claim severely constrains acceptable accounts of knowledge. It also helps accommo-
date skepticism about knowledge.
4.1 The value of knowledge
Why is knowledge valuable? This question is too rarely asked. I will try to show
that examining the value of knowledge sheds light on two central epistemological
questions: What is knowledge? Is it possible to attain knowledge?
The main claim of this chapter is that knowledge is no more valuable than
stable true belief. This claim is surprising. Doesn't knowledge have a unique and
special value? If the main claim is correct and if, as it seems, knowledge is not stable
true belief, then knowledge does not have a unique value: stable true belief is just as
valuable.
I draw three conclusions. First, the main claim does not devalue knowledge or
undermine our knowledge gathering practices. Second, skepticism about knowledge
is harmless. Even if one cannot have knowledge, one can have something just as
valuable. Third, any attempt to analyze the concept of knowledge faces a severe
constraint.
But before drawing any conclusions from the main claim, I must first explain and
defend it. I turn to that task next.
4.1.1 The main claim motivated and clarified
The main claim motivated
In the Meno, Plato raises a question about the value of knowledge.[53, 97A-98A] If,
wonders Plato, a man knows which road leads to Larissa, he can surely get there.
And if a man does not know, but has a true belief about which road leads to Larissa,
he can get there all the same. Why then is it better for him to know which r-ad leads
to Larissa? Why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Plato's answer
is that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because mere true belief can
be easily lost; knowledge, however, is "fastened" by an explanation and thus more
difficult to lose.
The Platonic thought is that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief
because knowledge is more stable. Here is an example to make this thought clearer:
Restaurant reviewers Joe and Renata are dining in a fancy new trattoria.
Joe knows that the unusual mushroom on Renata's plate is poisonous. Re-
nata does not know that the unusual mushroom on her plate is poisonous,
although she has a true belief that the unusual mushroom is poisonous.
Renata concluded this from her false belief that the chef, bitter at her
negative reviews, is trying to poison her. The chef, in fact, holds no
grudge; he has simply made a mistake. The chef comes out and clearly
does not recognize Renata. So she gives up her belief that the mushroom
is poisonous, and starts to eat it. Renata is in danger because her true
belief was easily dislodged by new evidence. Luckily for Renata, Joe's
knowledge is not so fragile; Joe, who knows, is able to stop her in time.1
IT. Williamson gives a similar example.[71, 87]
Examples like the case of Joe and Renata help make Plato's two theses look very
plausible:
(1) Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.
(2) Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because knowledge is more
stable.
Indeed, (2) suggests a bolder thesis:
(3) Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief only because knowledge is more
stable.
The bolder (3) is a short step from the main claim of this essay. For if (3) is correct,
then, plausibly, a true belief which is as stable as knowledge is no less valuable than
knowledge. That is my main claim.
So the main claim is motivated by the Platonic thought. But none of these theses
and claims are particularly clear. What is stability? What is mere true belief?
Why does stability help make knowledge (or true belief) valuable? What, exactly,
is supposed to be valuable? Is it information, the state of knowing, the concept of
knowledge, or what?2
The main claim clarified
Here are two steps to clarify the main claim. First, compare the value of states, as
opposed to the value of concepts or the value of information. Second, understand
stability as the length of time that a state will last. One state is more stable than
another just in case the former state will last longer than the latter.
The main claim is thus: the state of knowing that p is no more valuable
than the state of having a true belief that p which will last at least as long.
2Somewhat surprisingly, in recent literature, thesis (1) is presented as an obviously true premise
to be used in philosophical argument. Zagzebski[73] argues that reliabilist accounts of epistemic jus-
tification are incompatible with (1), and, since (1) is obviously true, reliabilism should be rejected.
Jones[37] argues, more generally, that any account of epistemic justification which sees epistemic
justification as valuable only as a means to gaining true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, is incom-
patible with (1), and thus objectionable. Riggs[56] replies that Jones's and Zabzebski's arguments
only support the weak conclusion that, in order to preserve (1), certain accounts of justification need
to be supplemented. Another sort of argument is given by DePaul[21j and Riggs[57]. They conclude
that gaining true beliefs and avoiding falsehoods cannot be the only epistemic values, otherwise (1)
would be false.
Since this is rather longwinded, in the interests of brevity, I will often abbreviate this
by saying that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief.
I could have chosen other clarificatory steps. For example, instead of discussing
the value of the state of knowing, I might have discussed the value of the concept of
knowledge. The value of the concept of knowledge is not my topic. Indeed, the value
of the concept of knowledge should be clearly distinguished from the value of the
state of knowing. The concept of knowledge may be valuable even if no one knows
anything, just as the concept of a perfect vacuum may be valuable even if no perfect
vacuums exist. Conversely, the state of knowing where to find his favorite toy may be
valuable to a child, even if he has no need for the concept of knowledge. I will focus
on the value of the state of knowing, leaving other questions about value for another
occasion.
The second clarificatory step may seem odd. I say that a state is more stable
just in case it will last longer. But the word "stable" is usually understood to mean
something like "unlikely to be changed" or "not easily changed"; stability is more
naturally understood as a modal property, like fragility. Here I must ask the reader's
patience; it will soon becorme clear why I have chosen an unusual notion of stability.
Some readers may continue to feel puzzled by the main claim that the state of
knowing that p is no more valuable than the state of having a true belief that p which
will last at least as long. In what respect are we to compare these two states? Their
value for action? Their intrinsic value? Or what? The answer: we are to compare
these two states in any respect in which knowing is valuable. In gory detail, then,
the main claim is: in any respect in which the state of knowing that p is
valuable, the state of having a true belief that p which will last at least as
long, is just as valuable.
4.2 What is the value of knowledge?
I will now defend the main claim by exhaustively examining proposals to explain why
knowledge is valuable. For each proposal, I will argue that if knowledge has that
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value, then stable true belief does too.
4.2.1 Knowledge is useful
It is sometimes suggested that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is useful.
Proposals along these lines include: knowledge enhances your chance of survival;
knowledge helps you make good decisions; knowledge helps you satisfy your desires;
knowledge helps you to act morally; knowledge gives you power over others.
These proposals are easily dealt with. In each case, it is easy to see that a stable
true belief is just as valuable.
According to these proposals, knowledge is useful for action- useful either in
deciding which action to choose or in carrying out an action. Plato has already gone
down this road. In trying to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true
belief, Plato considers why knowledge is more useful to a person performing the action
of traveling to Larissa.
Unlike Plato, I am comparing the value of knowledge to the value of stable true
belief. Is knowledge more useful for action than stable true belief? Consider a case
where knowledge enhances your chances of survival. If I know there is an angry,
hungry tiger behind the door, then, as long as I am trying to stay alive, I won't open
it. My knowledge keeps me from life-threating danger. If I have a stable true belief
that there is an angry, hungry tiger behind the door, then, as long as I am trying to
stay alive, I won't open it either. Knowledge seems to have no advantage here.
The example suggests a general point. When deciding what to do, it is useful to
have an accurate picture of the world. And when acting, and it is useful to maintain
an accurate picture of the world. But my picture of the world, with respect to the
proposition p, is no more accurate when I know that p, than when I truly believe
that p. And when maintaining an accurate picture of the world, knowing that p, and
stably, truly believing that p, are on a par.
I hear grumbles about this line of thought. One objector claims that false beliefs
are sometimes more useful than knowledge. A rough and ready picture of the world
can be better than an accurate one. For one thing, gaining true beliefs or knowledge
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sometimes carries too high a cost. In response, although false beliefs may sometimes
be more useful than knowledge, I am comparing the value of knowing that p to the
value of having a stable true belief that p. Whether or not it is sometimes better to
have a false belief is beside the point.
A second objector notices that, in some situations, knowing that p is clearly more
valuable than having a mere stable true belief that p. Consider an evil demon who
will hinder my actions as long as I fail to know that p. Then, I'd be better off
knowing that p than having a mere stable true belief that p. Such cases are to be
expected. The presence of an instrumental value can require that certain background
conditions hold. An example: a refrigerator, normally useful to keep the milk from
going sour, doesn't help much during a long blackout. Although a stable true belief
may normally be useful for action, in this evil demon case, it is not. Although the
second objector's point is correct, the claim here should anyway be limited to normal
conditions: Knowledge is, in normal conditions, no more useful for action than stable
true belief. That said, for brevity, I'll now drop the reference to normal conditions.
I conclude that if the value of knowledge lies only in its usefulness for action, then
knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. But there are other proposals
for the value of knowledge.
4.2.2 Valuable for others
Your knowledge is not only valuable for you, it is valuable for others as well. You
can inform others. You can give them a stock tip, warn them of imminent danger, or
just satisfy their intellectual curiosity. Could your knowing that p be more valuable
for others than your having a true belief that p? This looks like a non-starter. When
you know that p you can inform your friend that p. Just as easily, when you have a
stable true belief that p you can inform your friend that p.
There is more to say. As E. J. Craig[20] notices, being a good informant involves
more than having a true belief. A good informant is recognizable as a good informant;
someone trying to find out whether p needs to be able to pick a good informant out
of a crowd. According to Craig, a good informant not only has a true belief that p,
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she has a detectable property X which correlates well with being right about p.
Craig's broader project is curious. He suggests that thinking about our practical
need to find good informants helps us to explain why our concept of knowledge is
the way it is. Thus, he tries to understand the concept of knowledge by means of
the concept of being a good informant. But Craig does not make the straightforward
claim that to know that p is to be a good informant whether p. Instead, according
to him, the concept of knowledge is a stretched and twisted version of the concept of
being a good informant.
I simplify Craig's wide-ranging discussion, and extract the following thought:
knowing that p is valuable to others because someone who knows that p often has a
detectable property which correlates well with having a true belief that p. So let us
look to see if knowing does have such a detectable property, and, if it does, whether
that makes knowledge more valuable than stable true belief.
Here is one possibility: A person who knows that p can often give reasons in
support of his view about p. If so- if a person who knows that p can often defend his
view when asked- then knowing looks to have an advantage over mere stable true
believing. When you are looking for a good informant, you can ask your target what
reasons she has. If she knows that p, she can often give you some. So you can often
get some evidence that she knows that p.
Stable true belief differs from knowledge in this respect. If a person has a stable
true belief that p, she just has that belief. She may or may not have reasons. If
knowing that p often comes with reasons, then knowing that p is, apparently, more
valuable to others than having a stable true belief that p. This conflicts with the
main claim.
I see two satisfactory ways to respond. The first way is to retreat to an extended
version of the main claim. Rather than comparing knowing that p to having a stable
true belief that p, compare knowing that p to having a stable group of true beliefs.
Include in the stable group of true beliefs not only a true belief that p, but some
reasons in favor of p that the person can give. A person who has this stable group
of beliefs can give evidence that she has a true belief that p. Although a retreat
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from the main claim, this response does not depart from its spirit- that there is
nothing distinctively valuable about knowledge not found in stable true belief. If
indeed knowing that p is often detectable because knowing that p often comes with
reasons, then this group of stable true beliefs is equally detectable.
A second way to respond maintains the main claim in the face of the objection.
Consider, for the moment, a person who is rational, and who will continue to be
rational, in the following sense: She will respond to evidence by modifying her belief
state appropriately. Thus, she will not, for example, hold on to some belief out
of stubbornness despite the evidence. Now a person rational in this sense at least
arguably often has reasons for her beliefs. For, without reasons for many of her beliefs,
how can a person always respond appropriately to evidence? But if a rational person
often has reasons for her beliefs, then a rational person with a stable true belief that p
often has reasons in favor of her belief that p. So a rational person with a stable true
belief is often able to defend her view. Thus, if we restrict the discussion to rational
people, there is no advantage here for knowing that p.
And there is reason to restrict the discussion to rational people. Consider one
example. Poor Julia knows that her car is parked on floor 3 row R. Unfortunately,
she changes her belief state willy-nilly whenever she sees a red car. On the way to
her car, she suddenly sees a red car, and she gives up her earlier belief, and comes
to believe that her car is parked on floor 2 row B. A moment later, she comes to
believe that her car is parked on floor 12 row D. It is difficult to make sense of the
thought that Julia's knowing where her car was had any value for her. That state
had no reasonable role in her cognitive life. Julia does not respond appropriately to
evidence, and it is difficult to understand why knowing has value for her. This is just
one case, but it supports restricting the discussion to rational people. More should
be said, but I think that this is enough to show that there is at least some plausibility
in responding to the objection by restricting the discussion to rational people.
I prefer the second of these responses, because it holds on to the main claim. But
either response, I believe, satisfactorily dispenses with the objection that knowing
that p is more valuable because a person who knows that p often has the detectable
104
property of having reasons to believe p. Even so, knowing that p may sometimes be
accompanied by some other detectable property.
I can think of only one other plausible candidate detectable property.3 When you
know that p, you often know related things. When searching for a good informant
as to p, I can ask you about related topics of which I am already informed. If you
know about these topics, I have evidence that you know whether p. Arguably, then,
knowing that p is more valuable than a stable true belief that p because a stable true
belief that p may stand alo r-, unaccompanied by true beliefs about related topics.
Again, this conclusion conflicts with the main claim.
As before, one may retreat to an extended version of the main claim. Talk not of
a stable true belief that p, but a group of stable true beliefs, including beliefs about
related topics. Knowing that p, even if accompanied by knowledge of related topics,
is not more valuable that this group of stable true beliefs.
Although this reply is adequate, we can do better, and preserve the main claim.
There is no reason to think that a person with a stable true belief that p is less likely
be exposed to information about related topics than a person who knows that p. A
person with a stable true belief surely has the same opportunity to learn about related
topics. So there is no reason to think that a person with a stable true belief is any
less informed about related topics. So knowing that p is not more valuable even if
often accompanied by knowledge of related topics.
I can see no further plausible reason t., think that knowledge is more valuable to
others than stable true belief. Let's move on.
4.2.3 Knowledge as an achievement
One somewhat vague suggestion is that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is an
achievement. Riggs[56][57] tries to cache out this vague suggestion. Riggs' thought is
that knowing that p is valuable (in part) because a person who knows that p deserves
3Well-known analyses of knowledge fail to provide a plausible candidate. A true belief reliably
formed[28], or the output of properly functioning cognitive equipment[52], or tracking the truth in
nearby possible worlds[50], is no more detectable than a generic stable true belief.
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some epistemic credit for having reached that state:
Being in the state of "knowing that p" entails of a person that she have
a true belief for which she deserves a certain degree of epistemic credit.
Believing something true by accident entails no credit of any sort to the
person. This is so despite the fact that the belief is no more valuable in
the former case then the latter, nor need we assume that the believers
in question differ in their respective epistemic qualities. The difference
that makes a value difference here is the variation in the degree to which
a person's abilities, powers, and skills are causally responsible for the
outcome, believing truly that p.[57, 94]
Riggs seems to think that he has isolated a value distinctive of knowing, as opposed
to mere true believing. A Gettier-style example shows that this is not correct; mere
true believers can deserve just as much epistemic credit as knowers. Suppose that
Ned comes to know that someone at the lab owns a Toyota, having often seen Jones
drive around in Jones' own Toyota. Jed, who works in the same lab, comes to truly
believe that, someone at the lab owns a Toyota, having often seen Smith drive around
in Jones' Toyota. Since Smith owns no car, although Jed's belief is true, Jed does not
know. Ned and Jed, we can assume, are causally responsible to just the same degree
for their true beliefs. So, by Riggs' lights, they deserve the same epistemic credit for
their respective true beliefs.
Perhaps Riggs' point is instead that knowers always deserve some epistemic credit,
but mere true believers only sometimes do. This may be correct. But that does not
mean that knowers always deserve at least as much epistemic credit as mere true
believers do. In fact, knowers sometimes deserve less epistemic credit than mere true
believers: Joe the policeman happens to walk by at the moment Lefty the gardener
pets the dog. Joe comes to know that one of the gardeners petted the dog. Smitty
the detective, after an exhaustive and careful investigation, comes to falsely believe
that Righty the gardener petted the dog. Smitty concludes that one of the gardeners
petted the dog. Surely Smitty is more causally responsible for his true belief than
Joe. So, apparently, by Riggs' lights, Smitty deserves more epistemic credit. That
means Joe, who knows, deserves less epistemic credit than Smitty, who has a mere
true belief; someone who knows can deserve less epistemic credit than someone with a
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mere true belief. Thus Riggs' proposal does not support the conclusion that knowing
is more valuable than stable true belief.
Step back from Riggs proposal, and return to the thought that knowledge is valu-
able because it is an achievement. Sometimes knowledge is an admirable achievement.
But not always; sometimes knowledge comes easy. And sometimes stable true belief
is an admirable achievement. But not always; sometimes stable true belief comes
easy. Either state can be an achievement or not. So we have not yet found some-
thing distinctive of knowing which makes knowing that p more valuable than having
a stable true belief that p.
4.2.4 A close connection to the world
Another thought is that knowing involves a close connection to world; knowing gives
you a firm grip on the way things are.
More specificity is needed to evaluate this thought. Robert Nozick's tracking
theory of knowledge is one way to make this close connection idea more precise.[50]
Bells and whistles aside, Nozick claims that to know that p is to have a true belief
that p which tracks the truth, where your belief that p tracks the truth just in case:
if p were false you wouldn't believe that p, and if p were true you would believe that
p. Possible worlds talk helps make the notion of truth-tracking clearer. Your belief
tracks the truth just in case in nearby possible worlds where p is true, you believe
it, and in nearby possible worlds where p is false, you don't. A person with a truth-
tracking belief has a grip on the way things are- small changes in the way things are
would not disturb his grip on the truth.
Even if (as compelling examples suggest) Nozick's conditions are neither necessary
nor jointly sufficient for knowing that p, his proposal has an appeal which suggests
that he may be on the right track. So it is worth asking whether a truth-tracking
belief is more valuable than a stable true belief.
Initially, it seems implausible to think that a truth-tracking belief is more valuable
than a stable true belief. Why would you would care whether or not your beliefs track
the truth in some nearby possible world? You are not in some nearby possible world;
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you are in the actual world. If in some nearby world you get hit by a car, come down
with the measles or get a terrible toothache, too bad for you in that possible world.
Luckily, you are in this world, where these things didn't occur. Similarly, in some
nearby world you may have some extra false beliefs, or fail to have some true ones.
So what. You are in the actual world where this didn't occur.
Yet, there is reason to care whether your beliefs track the truth in nearby worlds:
you don't know which world you are in. Moreover, since some of your beliefs are
almost certainly false, you are almost certainly in a world that you consider to be
merely possible. Thus, since you care whether or not your beliefs are true in the
actual world, you should care whether or not your beliefs are true in worlds that you
consider to be merely possible.
This reasoning does not show that truth-tracking beliefs are more valuable than
mere stable true beliefs. According to this reasoning you should care whether or not
your beliefs are true in worlds that you consider to be merely possible because you
care whether or not your beliefs are true in the actual world. But if your belief is
stable and true, then it is stable and true in the actual world; if your belief is stable
and true then you have what you want already. Having true beliefs (and avoiding
false beliefs) in some other world does not satisfy any further want.
(A similar line of thought explains why the notion of stability in the main claim
is persistance in the actual world. Ask a parallel question: why should you care
whether a true belief is resistant- whether a belief would be held truly in some other
possible situation? The answer that comes to mind is that since you don't know what
situation you are in, you want to hedge your bets. So you ensure that the belief is
truly held in a range of situations. But if you have a persisting true belief, you have
what you want already- that the belief continue to be held and be true in the actual
world. Having a resistant true belief gives you nothing further that you want.)
Let's take stock. I turned to Nozick's tracking account of knowledge in developing
the idea that knowing involves a close connection to the world. Then I tried and
failed to find a reason to think that a truth-tracking belief is more valuable than a
stable true belief. But perhaps truth-tracking was not the right place to start. Let's
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try again.
One thought is that stable true belief can be lucky in a way that knowing cannot,
and in a way that weakens your connection to the world. Big Al thinks the government
owes him $200. Big Al is right, but only by luck. His accountant made several errors
on his tax return which cancelled each other out. Luckily for Al, his belief is stable;
he won't notice any of the errors. Al's grip on fact that the government owes him
$200 seems tenuous. Al's connection to the world seems much weaker than that of
Slim, who comes to know that the government owes him $200 because his accountant,
who made no mistake, tells him so.
There is a good reason to disvalue luck: as any gambler knows (or should know),
you can't count on luck. Luck comes and goes. But why think that luck makes Al's
state more tenuous (and thus less valuable) than Slim's? One reason is that Al is in a
state that could easily be lost if his luck turns bad. However, we should not disvalue
Al's state because his good luck might run out. For his luck won't run out; his state
won't be lost- it is stable.
Another reason to think that luck makes Al's state less valuable than Slim's is
that Al was very lucky to have a true belief. He might easily have had a false one.
His accountant could have easily made one less error. Again, however, we should
not disvalue Al's state because he might easily have had a false belief. Knowving
can depend on luck in just the same way: I should have mentioned earlier that Slim
usually uses Al's mediocre accountant, but this year he was lucky that his cousin the
excellent accountant was visiting at tax time.
This is enough, I think, to see that this is another false lead. Knowing can occur
by luck, be maintained by luck, or not. Stable true believing can occur by luck, or be
maintained by luck, or not. So stable true belief is not dependent on luck in a way
that makes it less valuable than knowledge.
Here is one last reason to think that knowing brings a closer connection to the
world than stable true belief. When you know that p you have a thorough understand-
ing which may be lacking when you have a stable true belief that p. For example,
Andrew Wiles knows that Fermat's Last Theorem is true because he proved it. He
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understands how FLT connects to other theorems; he understands why it is true.
Silly Billy, on the other hand, believes that Fermat's Last Theorem is true on the
basis of a mistaken proof he concocted in the eighth grade. Luckily for Billy, his belief
is stable. Unlike Wiles, however, Billy has no deep understanding.
The contrast between Billy and Wiles neglects an important point: Surely, you
can know that Fermat's Last Theorem is true without understanding why it is true.
You can know because the respected mathematician tells you so. Knowing that p
does not always bring a thorough understanding. But if knowing that p does not
always bring a thorough understanding, then knowing has no advantage over stable
true believing.
Maybe this answer is too quick. Perhaps someone who knows is more likely to
have a thorough understanding- and thus a closer connection to the world- than
someone who has a stable true belief. Now, as far as I can tell, having a thorough
understanding is just to know more things. For example, in addition to knowing
that FLT is true, Wiles knows how it follows from other theorems. If this is correct,
then one response is, as before, to retreat to the extended main claim, and maintain,
that knowing is no more valuable than a certain group of stable true beliefs. But, as
before, we can do better and maintain the main claim. One can insist that a stable
true believer is no less likely to acquire a thorough understanding than a knower. A
stable true believer is no less likely to be exposed to situations in which surrounding
stable true beliefs can be acquired. Although the retreat to the extended claim will
do, I prefer the latter response, in order to maintain the main claim.4
4.2.5 Valuable as a means
I may have missed something when arguing that truth-tracking belief is no more valu-
able than stable true belief. Nozick himself (in a section called "What's so special
4S. Haslanger[34] has a interesting suggestion worthy of mention. She suggests that knowledge
is valuable because knowers have and respond to reasons, and being responsive to reasons is part of
what it is to be autonomous- which is a constitutive part of a flourishing life which is valuable for
creatures like us. But if comparison between knowing and having a stable true belief is restricted to
people who are rational in the sense of being responsive to evidence, then the value that Haslanger
points to is plausibly present for a rational person, whether or not he has knowledge.
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about knowledge?") posits a value for truth-tracking belief. Nozick says that evolu-
tionary processes can't directly put true beliefs in our heads- they can only produce
a capability to form true beliefs in a changing world. But the kind of capability which
evolution can produce is a capability to form beliefs which track the truth.[50, p 283ff]
It is difficult to evaluate evolutionary considerations at this level of detail. But
Nozick's thought suggests an interesting proposal. How can you get a stable true
belief? Perhaps an effective way is to get- or at least try to get- knowledge.5
If this is right, then knowing that p may have a value that a stable true belief that
p lacks. Knowing th-at p is useful as a means to have a stable true belief that p. Or,
at least, trying to know that p is useful as a means to have a stable true belief that p.
I am unsure how to deny that knowing has this extra value- that knowing is
valuable as a means to stable true belief. But then the main claim- that knowledge
is no more valuable than stable true belief- is false.
However, admitting that the only extra value had by knowing is that knowing
is valuable as a means to stable true belief, is not to accept that knowing has a
significant value over and above stable true belief. For it is to accept that knowing
is valuable because stable true belief is. Stable true belief is the valuable end, not
knowledge. If stable true belief is not worth much, then a means solely to reach stable
true belief is not worth much either.
Even so, some readers may wish to add some fine print to the main claim: knowl-
edge is no more valuable than stable true belief, except insofar as knowledge is valuable
as a means to stable true belief.
4.2.6 Knowledge is worthless
An unusual proposal is that knowledge has no value. Jonathan Kvanvig[42] makes this
surprising claim, arguing that we value other things which we confuse with knowledge.
Suffice it to say that if knowledge has no value, the main claim is correct. If knowledge
has no value, knowledge surely has no more value than stable true belief.
5 A. Byrne suggested something like this to me.
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4.2.7 Knowledge is valuable in itself
I have discussed several different kinds of value which knowledge might have. The
first proposal was that knowledge is useful for action. The second proposal was
that knowledge is valuable for others. Both of these two proposals see knowledge as
valuable for the sake of something else. The third proposal was that knowledge is
valuable because it is an achievement. The fourth proposal was that knowledge is
valuable because knowing brings a close connection to the world. I have suggested that
these proposals see knowledge as valuable because something other than knowledge
is valuable. The fifth proposal was that knowledge is useful in getting stable true
beliefs. Again, this proposal sees knowledge as valuable for the sake of something
else.
Here are two distinctions in value.6 The first distinction is between being valued
for its own sake (as an end) and being valued for the sake of something else. For
example, if knowledge is valued because it is useful for action, then knowledge is
valued for the sake of something else- successful action. The second distinction is
between being valuable in itself and being valuable in virtue of something else. For
example, if knowledge is valuable because it is an achievement, then knowledge is
valuable because something else- achievement- is valuable. The first distinction is
a distinction in the way we value things, as ends or for the sake of something else.
The second is a distinction in the way things have value, in themselves (intrinsically)
or in virtue of something else (extrinsically).
So far I have discussed every proposal I can find according to which knowledge is
valued for the sake of something else. And I have discussed every proposal I can find
according to which knowledge is valuable in virtue of something else. (Some of the
proposals I have discussed fall into both of these categories.) I have argued that, if
knowledge has that value, then stable true belief has that value too. (Setting aside
the one exception discussed in the last section-- knowledge as valuable for the sake
6C. Korsgaard[40] draws similar distinctions and argues that should not be collapsed together. I
am indebted to Langton[43], who amends and criticizes Korsgaard's discussion. However, I ignore
many of the complexities which Langton uncovers.
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of stable true belief.) It seems fair to conclude that if knowledge is valuable for the
sake of or in virtue of something else, then stable true belief has that value too. But
that leaves two open questions: is knowledge valued as an end? is knowledge valuable
in itself?
There is evidence that it is. People talk about the value of learning for its own
sake. Research projects get funded on the grounds that they might bring us new
knowledge. Scholars spend years trying to answer obscure questions. But we need
stronger evidence than this, if we are to conclude that knowledge is valuable in itself,
or valued as an end.
A test for intrinsic value comes to us from G. E. Moore. To apply the isolation
test to see whether X has intrinsic value, you imagine a world in which nothing exists
except X, and ask whether X has value. Knowing presumably does not exist without
a knower, so imagine a world in which the only existing thing is a person P1 who
knows something. Since nothing exists except P1, one thing he might know about
is himself. So let's suppose that he knows that he exists. Is his knowing valuable?
Maybe. I am not sure. At least, I don't see any contrast with stable true belief. If
I imagine a different world in which nothing exists except P2, who has a stable true
belief that he exists, and ask whether his having a stable true belief is valuable, I
have the same reaction. As far as I can tell, this test only shows that if knowledge
has intrinsic value, then stable true belief does too.
Here is a second test. To apply the choice test to see whether X is more valuable
than Y, ask yourself whether you would rather choose a life in which you have X or
one in which you have Y. 7 This is not directly a test whether knowing is valuable in
itself, or as an end. However, given the conclusion that knowing is no more valuable
than stable true belief in virtue of, or for the sake of something else, this test will
indirectly help decide whether knowing is valuable in itself or as an end.
So here goes. Would you rather choose a life in which you know that the Federated
States of Micronesia gained independence in 1989, or one in which you merely have
a stable true belief that the FSM gained independence in 1989? Again, this is not
7N. Hall suggested this test.
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clear.
Here's a thought that may decide the question. In the life in which you merely
have the stable true belief, you may have the stable true belief because you concluded
it from a false belief, for example the patently false belief that all U. S. territories
gained independence in 1989. But in the life in which you know, you couldn't have
gained this knowledge by drawing a conclusion from this false belief. Otherwise you
would not have knowledge. Choosing the life with the mere stable true belief risks
having such patently false beliefs. So, since false beliefs are bad, you should choose
the life in which you know so as to avoid false belief.
This is not a good reason to choose the life in which you know. For you might still
have this false belief- indeed you might have many, many false beliefs- in the life in
which you know. You just can't gain your knowledge by drawing a conclusion from
such a falsehood. And in the life in which you merely have the stable true belief,
you might, in addition have a multitude of other stable true beliefs, comprising a
complete and comprehensive picture of the world. Thus, avoidance of false belief is
not a good reason to choose the life in which you know.
So let's try again. Would you choose the life in which you know over the life in
which you merely have a stable true belief? I find myself without a clear answer. (I
suppose someone might say, "Of course, I'll choose the life in which I know because
knowing is intrinsically valuable." But that won't help here, when trying to use the
choice as a test to decide whether or not knowing is intrinsically valuable.) This test
has not helped decide whether knowledge is valuable in itself.
Although more could be said, I believe that it is now time to give up the search
for some value of knowledge over stable true belief, and tentatively conclude that the
main claim is correct: knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief (except
insofar as knowledge is valuable as a means to stable true belief). I will now see what
conclusions follow from this claim about the value of knowledge.
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4.3 Conclusions
4.3.1 Skepticism not considered dangerous
Skepticism about knowledge is an affront to common sense. No one can know anything
about the past? Ridiculous. No one can know anything about the external world?
Absurd. No one can know anything at all? Crazy. According to common sense, we
know many things; according to common sense, such skeptical claims are obviously
false.
A difficulty arises. There are some appealing arguments leading to skeptical con-
clusions about knowledge. Many philosophers have faced this difficulty, strenuously
laboring to find flaws in skeptical arguments about knowledge.8 But we should pause
to ask whether such effort is necessary.
After all, there is an easier way out of the difficulty. We might instead- to
consider the extreme case- accept that no one can know anything. If the main claim
of this essay is correct then we need not hesitate to accept that no one can know
anything; skepticism about knowledge is not intellectually threatening. If knowledge
is not stable true belief, but knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief,
then even if no one can have knowledge, one can have something just as valuable:
stable true beliefs.
Is this an acceptable response to skepticism about knowledge?
I will now argue that it is.
Reasons for
The first reason that this response to skepticism should be accepted is that it fits
well with the way people actually respond to skepticism about knowledge. In my
experience the typical neophyte philosophy student gets convinced by skeptical argu-
ments about knowledge; the typical student agrees that, strictly speaking she doesn't
know anything. But that doesn't bother her, she says, as long as that does not mean
that her ordinary beliefs about the world are unreasonable, or should be given up.
8[39] and [54] contain recent attempts.
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The typical neophyte philosophy student is often puzzled by philosophers like Barry
Stroud who get themselves worked up about skepticism conclusions about knowledge:
"The consequences of accepting Descartes's conclusion as it is meant to be
understood are truly disastrous. There is no easy way of accommodating
oneself to its profound negative implications." [63, 38]
I don't mean to rely too heavily on the evidence of my own personal experience,
but it does seem to me that my experience is not unusual. (Perhaps one day an
experimental scientist will do philosophers a favor and get some good data about
how non-philosophers respond to skepticism.)
A second reason why this response to skepticism should be accepted is that it
is compatible with a straightforward explanation why some skeptical arguments are
compelling: some skeptical arguments about knowledge are sound. Those who try to
dismantle a skeptical argument have the burden both of explaining why that argument
is unsound, and why it appears sound. They try to explain both why we are almost
taken in, and why we should not be taken in. The approach I am suggesting is more
straightforward.
A third reason why this response to skepticism should be accepted is that other
approaches are inadequate. I won't argue this point here, except to note that no
approach to skepticism about knowledge is widely accepted (if not to simply ignore
skepticism and think about something else).
Further reasons make this approach to skepticism about knowledge appealing. It
is simple. It is general, applying to any argument that concludes that no one can
(or does) know anything about a certain subject matter. Nonetheless, it is perfectly
compatible with sometimes taking the usual approach for a skeptical argument: trying
to find a flaw in that argument.
Reasons against
There are objections to this approach to skepticism. But these objections do not
show that this approach is inadequate.
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One objection is that skepticism about knowledge is an affront to common sense.
According to common sense, skepticism about knowledge is obviously false. So it is
a mistake to accept skepticism about knowledge. In reply, if this objection is not to
be simple intransigence, one needs to see why common sense should carry the day.
That a belief is a common sense belief is certainly not, by itself, sufficient reason to
reject every argument to the contrary. So-called common sense has failed us in the
past. It was once common sense that women are less rational than men. It was once
common sense that slavery is morally permissible. Those common sense beliefs have,
thankfully, been left in the past. This is not to deny that common sense has weight;
it is where we start after all. But rejecting this approach to skepticism merely by
claiming that skepticism about knowledge conflicts with common sense is very weak.
A second objection is that it is not clear that we have stable true beliefs. Why is
it reasonable to believe that we have stable true beliefs? This objection looks serious.
If we cannot have stable true beliefs, then my main claim leads to an uninteresting
conclusion: even if we cannot have knowledge there is something else, just as valuable,
that we cannot have either. In reply: we have very good evidence that at least some
of our beliefs are both true and stable. Here is just one example. I believe that I have
blue eyes. Every time I look in the mirror I get more evidence that this belief is true;
my memory testifies that I have had this belief for a long time.
A third objection is that skeptical arguments about knowledge extend to skepti-
cism about stable true belief. A good skeptical argument about knowledge (if there
are any) might not simply threaten our knowledge alone. It may threaten to show
that none of our beliefs are stable or true. If so, then saying that even if one can-
not have knowledge one can have something of equal value- stable true beliefs- is
a Pyrrhic victory. I grant that the approach I have suggested for skepticism about
knowledge would be feeble indeed if accepting that no one can have knowledge about
some subject matter required one to accept that no one can have stable true beliefs
about that subject matter. Whether one form of skepticism leads to the other is not
clear. But if it does- if a skeptical argument about knowledge does lead to skepti-
cism about stable true belief, then, admittedly, a different response to skepticism is
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needed. I recommend the response in Chapter 3, where I argued that certain skeptical
arguments can be rationally ignored.
Setting skepticism aside, let me now turn to other lessons to be drawn from the main
claim.
4.3.2 Knowledge devalued?
The main claim that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief is initially
surprising. One might have thought that knowledge has a unique and special value,
that knowledge is the worthy goal of laborious effort, that knowledge is to be cherished
when attained. If the main claim is correct, then there is something just as valuable as
knowledge, which is not knowledge. So there is no special value unique to knowledge
alone.
However, it certainly does not follow from the main claim that knowledge is not
the worthy goal of laborious effort, or that knowledge is not to be cherished when
attained. Rather, if knowledge is the worthy goal of laborious effort, then stable true
belief is too. And if knowledge is to be cherished when attained, then stable true
belief is to be too. The main claim does not devalue knowledge; it reveals that there
is something else which is just as valuable.
Still, to the extent that our educational practices and methods of scholarship
are aimed at achieving knowledge rather than mere stable true belief, our practices
and methods may need revision. Maybe it is easier to get stable true beliefs than
knowledge; if so, we should give up our attempts to gain knowledge, and turn to
stable true belief activities.
Even so, I doubt that our practices need much revision. First, knowledge is a close
cousin of stable true belief, even if they differ. Assuming that knowledge requires true
belief, both require the hard work of getting true belief. That is no mean matter.
Second, as pointed out earlier, maybe a good way to get stable true beliefs is to get
knowledge. Or maybe a good way to get stable true beliefs is to seek knowledge. If
so, knowledge seeking practices should remain in place, as long as we are trying to
get stable true beliefs.
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4.3.3 Analyzing the concept of knowledge
The main claim sharply constrains any feasible analysis of the concept of knowledge
into true belief plus something more. If knowing that p requires a true belief that
p, then knowing that p requires an equally stable true belief that p. So, if knowing
that p requires a true belief that p plus something more, then knowing that p requires
an equally stable true belief that p plus something more. But what value does that
something more add to the value of knowing that p? Call that something more 'X'.
If the main claim is correct, then knowing that p is no more valuable than an equally
stable true belief that p. So if the main claim is correct, and if knowing that p requires
a true belief that p plus X, then, while the presence of X might help bring stability,
beyond that X adds no value. (The presence of X before a person comes to have a
true belief might be valuable in helping to get a true belief. But once the true belief
is held X no longer has this value. Also X might be valuable on its own- it might,
for example, be a stable true belief. But that does not add value to the true belief
that p.) If X is justification, then justification adds no value to the true belief beyond
helping make the true belief stable. If X is justification plus something to solve the
Gettier problem, then justification plus something to solve the Gettier problem adds
no value beyond helping to make the true belief stable.
This is surprising. But any attempt to produce an X is constrained by this fact:
If X adds any value to true belief, it adds stability.
4.3.4 Epistemic concepts
The foregoing considerations inspire a bolder claim: belief, stability and truth are the
central concepts for epistemology, not knowledge. If knowledge is true belief plus X,
then knowledge is a species of stable true belief. If, in addition, the main claim is
correct, then knowing is just one way to be in the valuable state of believing stably
and truly. Arguably, the central theoretical concepts are the ones needed to talk
about the valuable state: belief, stability, and truth. The concept of knowledge may
be interesting, but it is not the central concept.
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I offer the bolder claim only as a speculation. It would take several essays defend
it. However, it is interesting to note, as Timothy Williamson does, that "in recent
decades, questions of knowledge seem to have been marginalized by questions of
justification. ... Once Gettier showed in 1963 that justified true belief is insufficient
for knowledge, and therefore that knowledge is unnecessary for justified true belief,
it became natural to ask: if you can have justified true beliefs, why bother with
knowledge?" [71, p 184] (Williamson, by the way, disapproves. He thinks knowledge
is the unanalyzable central concept of epistemology.)
Failure to analyze the concept of knowledge may have led some philosophers to give
up on the concept of knowledge. But if the bolder claim is correct, even successfully
analyzing the concept of knowledge would not vindicate the concept of knowledge.
4.4 Final remarks
The main claim I have defended in this essay is that knowledge is no more valuable
than stable true belief. (With one possible exception: knowledge may be valuable as
a means to get stable true belief.) I drew three conclusions from the main claim.
1. Skepticism about knowledge is harmless.
2. Knowledge is not devalued. It is doubtful that we should give up our knowledge
gathering practices and methods.
3. Any attempt to analyze knowledge into true belief plus X is severely constrained
by the following fact: if X adds any value to the true belief, it only adds stability.
Finally, I added one speculative thought: knowledge is not an important concept for
epistemology; belief, stability and truth are.
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